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ABSTRACT 
I examine the association between fair value measurements and bank earnings management 
using financial data for a sample of U.S. bank holding companies from 2009 to 2012. I follow 
the methodology in Beatty et al. (2002) and find that banks reporting higher recurring basis fair 
values, especially level 2 fair values and banks reporting increased fair values are more likely to 
report small earnings increases both in the current year and one-year ahead after controlling for 
discretionary loan loss provisions, discretionary security gains and losses, and other bank-
specific characteristics. By decomposing the fair values into different types, I find that the 
positive association between fair value measurements and earnings management is primarily 
driven by available-for-sale assets. This relation can be found in both public banks and private 
banks.  I also distinguish upward earnings management from downward earnings management 
and find that level 2 fair values are positively associated with upward earnings management and 
with downward earnings management via discretionary security gains and losses. By examining 
the relation between earnings volatility and fair value measurements, I find that banks 
recognizing more level 2 fair value assets and liabilities report smoother earnings over the time. 
 
Key words: earnings management, fair value measurements, SFAS 157, fair value option, SFAS 
159, discretionary loan loss provisions, discretionary security gains and losses 
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1. Introduction 
This dissertation studies the association between fair value accounting in current financial 
reporting practice and banks earnings management. The ideal concept of fair value accounting is 
that all assets and liabilities of a firm are measured at fair value instead of historical cost and any 
change in the fair value of an asset or a liability is reported in the current period net income. 
Proponents of fair value accounting argue that it better reflects how much a firm’s assets and 
liabilities are worth, therefore, it provides more relevant information to investors. Opponents 
think that fair value is not as objective or reliable as historical cost. Fair value accounting 
requires more subjective judgments in the process of preparing accounting information, which 
may bring inaccuracy and uncertainty. The debate over fair value accounting never stops; 
nevertheless, it is the trend that fair value accounting will be used more extensively. A recently 
issued standard, SFAS 157 Fair Value Measurements, provides practical guidance on how to 
consistently measure fair values within the scope of existing standards on fair value accounting. 
Moreover, SFAS 157 requires firms to measure fair value assets and liabilities into three levels. 
The subsequently issued standard, SFAS 159 Fair Value Option, brings fair value accounting 
into a new stage by allowing firms to measure many other assets and liabilities at fair value. As 
fair value accounting evolves, the current financial reporting practice is a mix of fair value 
accounting and historical cost accounting. Some assets are reported at fair value with changes in 
fair value recognized in net income, e.g., trading assets and certain derivatives. Some assets are 
measured at fair value with changes in fair value reported in equity, e.g., available-for-sale assets. 
Some assets are measured at amortized cost, e.g., held-to-maturity assets. The objective of this 
research is to use fair value information disclosed under standards 157 and 159 to detect earnings 
management. I examine earnings management in the banking industry because banks hold large 
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amounts of financial assets and liabilities, which are most affected by current fair value 
accounting standards.  
Recent research on fair value measurements finds that value relevance is decreasing 
(Song et al. 2010) and information risk is increasing (Riedl and Serafeim 2011) across the level 1, 
level 2 and level 3 fair values.1 Studies on the impact of fair value measurements on audit fees 
show that audit fees increase as the extent of fair value measurements increases, especially level 
3 fair values (Ettredge et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2010). Fiechter and Meyer (2010) study a sample 
of public U.S. bank holding companies from Q1 2008 to Q1 2009 and find evidence of a bath 
taking behavior via level 3 unrealized security gains and losses. Song (2008) examines 
characteristics of a sample of public banks which adopt the fair value option. The univariate tests 
in his study show that fair value option adopters are more likely to meet earnings benchmarks for 
the same quarter of prior years and market expectations.    
This study is motivated by the critiques and concerns on fair value accounting and 
explores the relation between fair value measurements described in SFAS 157 and earnings 
management. Researchers and practitioners believe that fair values, especially fair values based 
on inputs which are not directly observed, are subject to manipulation (Benston 2008, Benson 
and Teclezion 2007). Following Beatty et al. (2002), I measure earnings management as small 
earnings increases. The literature on meeting or beating earnings benchmarks show that firms use 
discretionary accounting choices to avoid earnings decreases, losses or missing market 
expectations. Hence, firms whose earnings just meet or beat benchmarks can be considered as 
manipulating earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Degeorge et al. 1999, Beatty et al. 2002). 
                                                 
1 SFAS157 describes a fair value hierarchy based on the inputs of fair value measurement. Level 1 fair value inputs are quoted 
prices directly observable from active markets for identical assets and liabilities. Level 2 fair value inputs can be directly or 
indirectly observable, and exclude the level 1 inputs.  Level 3 fair value inputs are unobservable allowing firms to use internal 
models and assumptions (SFAS 157, paragraph 22-31). 
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Graham et al. (2005) show that about 85.1% of the surveyed CFOs in their sample consider 
earnings in the same quarter of the prior year to be important. I expect that firms reporting higher 
fair values are more likely to report small earnings increases, consistent with the concerns 
expressed by scholars and practitioners.  
I select a sample of U.S. public and private bank holding companies during the period 
2009-2012 from the Federal Reserve Bank Holding Company Database which have available fair 
value assets and liabilities information and other necessary financial data. I use a logistic 
regression model and examine the association between fair values and the probability of 
reporting small earnings increases.  
Following Burglestahler and Dichev (1997), I first examine the distributions of earnings 
changes for the high fair value and the low fair value group. I find a discontinuity around zero in 
the earnings change distributions of both the high fair value group and the low fair value group, 
however, the kink for the high fair value group is significantly larger than the kink for the low 
fair value group. The multivariate test shows that banks with higher recurring basis fair values 
are more likely to report small earnings increases both in the current year and one-year ahead 
after controlling for discretionary loan loss provisions, discretionary security gains and losses as 
well as other bank-specific characteristics. By decomposing the total fair values into three levels 
based on the fair value hierarchy specified in SFAS 157, I find that higher level 2 fair values 
significantly increase the probability that a firm reports small earnings increases, while level 1 
and level 3 fair values do not affect that probability. I further decompose fair values into 
different types.2 The findings suggest that the positive association between fair values and the 
probability of reporting small earnings increases is driven by level 2 available-for-sale assets. I 
                                                 
2 The classification of different types of assets and liabilities is based on Schedule HC-Q, Financial Assets and Liabilities 
Measured at Fair Value of the call form, such as, loans, trading assets, available-for-sale assets, Federal funds securities, deposits, 
trading liabilities, loan commitments, and all other assets and liabilities, etc. 
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also find that increases in level 2 fair values are positively associated with the probability of 
reporting small earnings increases. Next, I investigate bank-years which report small earnings 
changes before discretionary loan loss provisions or before discretionary security gains and 
losses in the high fair value subsample and in the low fair value subsample. The results show that 
high fair value bank-years are more likely to manage earnings upward to beat prior year earnings 
targets by reducing the discretionary loan loss provisions or increasing discretionary security 
gains and losses. 
To distinguish upward earnings management from downward earnings management, I 
define upward earnings management as bank-years which have earnings decreases before 
discretionary loan loss provisions or discretionary security gains and losses, but have small 
earnings increases after. I define downward earnings management as bank-years which have 
large earnings increases before discretionary loan loss provisions or discretionary security gains 
and losses, and have small earnings increases after. I find that high level 2 fair values are 
positively associated with upward earnings management through both accounting choices. Level 
2 fair values are positively associated with downward earnings management only through 
discretionary security gains and losses.  
Then I examine the factors which determine the net changes in fair values recognized in 
earnings. This test considers earnings management through net changes in fair values as a third 
channel separately from discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and 
losses. In a subsample of 324 bank-years reporting change in fair values of assets and liabilities 
elected for fair value options, I find that net changes in fair values recognized in earnings are 
negatively associated with the income before net changes in fair values, consistent with earnings 
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smoothing. I also find that net changes in fair values are positively associated with level 2 fair 
value assets.  
Finally, I examine the association between earnings volatility and fair value 
measurements. I find that banks recognizing more overall (level 2) fair value assets and liabilities 
report smoother earnings over the time.  
My study contributes to two streams of research. I contribute to the literature examining 
earnings management of banks. Beatty et al. (2002) provide evidence that public banks report 
more small earnings increases and less small earnings decreases than private firms by reporting 
lower discretionary loan loss provisions and higher discretionary security gains and losses. 
Beatty and Harris (1999) provide evidence that public banks are more likely to manipulate 
security gains to smooth earnings than private banks. I contribute to this line of research on using 
fair value information disclosed in the financial statements regulated by SFAS 157 to detect 
earnings management. Specifically, I show that banks with higher overall (level 2) fair values or 
banks with increased overall (level 2) fair values are more likely to beat prior year earnings 
targets.  
I also contribute to the literature on fair value measurements. Prior studies find that level 
3 fair values are less value relevant (Song et al. 2010), associated with a higher cost of capital 
(Riedl and Serafeim 2011) and associated with an increase in audit fees (Ettredge et al. 2010). 
Fiechter and Meyer (2010) find that banks take a big bath via level 3 unrealized gains and losses 
during the financial crisis. Liao et al. (2010) document a positive association between 
information asymmetry and all three levels of fair value net assets and loan loss provisions 
during the financial crisis. I contribute to this line of research by examining the association 
between three level fair values, especially level 2 fair values, and the probability that a bank 
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reports small earnings increases. My findings suggest that investors, analysts or auditors should 
pay attention to banks with large level 2 fair values assets, especially large level 2 available for 
sale assets and with large increases in level 2 fair values as those banks are more likely to engage 
in earnings management.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and 
motivation of this study. Section 3 reviews prior research on earnings management of banks and 
research on fair value accounting. Section 4 discusses the research methodology and sample 
selection. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Background and motivation 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 157 Fair Value Measurements in September 2006, which was effective on 
November 15, 2007. SFAS 157 “defines fair value, establishes a framework for measuring fair 
value, and expands disclosures about fair value measurements” (SFAS 157, p.6 paragraph 1).3 
SFAS 157 “does not require any new fair value measurements” but consolidates the different 
definitions and applications of fair value in previously issued standards on fair value accounting 
(SFAS 157, p.2). This statement describes a fair value hierarchy based on the inputs of fair value 
measurement. Level 1 fair value inputs are quoted prices directly observable from active markets 
for identical assets and liabilities. Level 2 fair value inputs can be directly or indirectly 
observable, and exclude the level 1 inputs.  Level 3 fair value inputs are unobservable allowing 
firms to use internal models and assumptions (SFAS 157, paragraph 22-31). Firms are required 
to disclose in their financial reports the assets and liabilities measured at fair value in each level. 
                                                 
3 SFAS 157 defines fair value as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly 
transaction between market participants at the measurement date.” (SFAS 157, p.6 paragraph 5) 
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Appendix C presents an example of fair value measurements disclosure in the 10-K of Wells 
Fargo & Company (WFC) on Dec. 31, 2012. WFC reports $358,659 million in assets at fair 
value and $22,390 million in liabilities at fair value. Specifically, it reports $13,561 million level 
1 assets, $355,327 million level 2 assets, $51,879 million level 3 assets, $5,732 million level 1 
liabilities, $84,670 million level 2 liabilities, and $3,104 million level 3 liabilities. Some 
researchers and practitioners criticize the difficulties in applying and verifying fair value 
measurements. For example, Benston (2008) points out that “fair values other than those taken 
from quoted prices (level 1) could be readily manipulated by opportunistic and overoptimistic 
managers, would be costly to make, and very difficult for auditors to verify and challenge” 
(Benston 2008, p.104). The following is a quotation from a newsletter of iComp, LLC, a 
company providing services on firm, asset, and liabilities valuation: 
“The additional levels of discretion allotted management under this regulation, in the 
presence of limited valuation guidance, will, ultimately, increase their ability to manage 
earnings over time. This ability will increase directly with the proportion of Level 2 and Level 3 
assets (liabilities) held by the firm.”  
Although managers have discretion over both level 2 and level 3 fair values, it may be 
easier to manipulate level 2 fair values than level 3 fair values for two reasons. First, companies 
hold a higher dollar value of level 2 assets and liabilities than level 3 assets and liabilities. Take 
the sample in this study as an example. Level 2 fair values account for about 76% of the total fair 
values, on average, while level 3 fair values account for only about 3%. This implies that there is 
more room to manage earnings through level 2 fair values. Within level 2 fair values, about 91% 
of level 2 fair values are available-for-sale assets. Second, there is mandatory detailed disclosure 
for level 3 fair values but no such disclosure requirement for level 2 fair values. SFAS 157 
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requires companies to reconcile the beginning and ending balances and to disclose changes due 
to 1) total gains and losses for the period; 2) purchases, sales, issuances, and settlements; 3) 
transfers in and out of level 3 (SFAS157, p.12). Appendix D presents the disclosure of changes 
in level 3 assets and liabilities measured at fair value of Wells Fargo & Company for the year 
ended Dec. 31, 2012. This disclosure is not required for level 1 or level 2 assets and liabilities. 
Among 276 public banks in my sample, only two banks provide such disclosure for level 1 and 
level 2 assets and liabilities.  The more detailed disclosure requirement for level 3 fair values 
makes it more difficult to manipulate level 3 fair values since level 3 fair values will receive 
more attention from investors, auditors and regulators. Ryan (2008, p.1628) points out that “The 
required disclosures are considerably more detailed for level 3 fair value measurements” and 
“These disclosures make the effects of level 3 measurements on the financial statements 
considerably more transparent than they would have been under prior GAAP.” He also mentions 
that “Indeed, given the poor quality market signals currently being generated, I believe level 3 
fair value measurements supported by disclosures of critical inputs and the sensitivity of the 
measurements to the inputs often would be considerably more informative to users of financial 
reports than poor quality level 2 fair value measurements.” (Ryan 2008, p.1628) In addition, 
discussion with practitioners indicates that level 3 fair values have small dollar values and 
managers are conservative in reporting level 3 fair values. Hence, I expect that firms reporting 
higher fair values, especially higher level 2 fair values are more likely to engage in and are more 
effective in earnings management. 
Following prior literature, I use beating prior year earnings targets to proxy for earnings 
management. According to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), there are two underlying theories 
explaining why managers have strong incentives to beat or meet earnings benchmarks. First, 
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according to transaction cost theory, meeting earnings targets reduces transaction costs. Second, 
prospect theory shows that an individual’s value function is assumed to be concave in gains and 
convex in losses, therefore, the increase in value is greatest when beating the earnings target. In 
practice, managers care about earnings benchmarks. Graham et al (2005) show that about 85.1% 
of the CFOs in their sample consider earnings in the same quarter of the prior year to be 
important. To summarize, I expect that banks recognizing higher fair value assets and liabilities 
are more likely to beat prior year earnings targets.  
 
3. Literature and hypotheses 
This study follows two streams of research: 1) research on bank earnings management; 
and 2) research on fair value accounting. In this section, I briefly review the two streams of 
research. 
3.1 Earnings management of banks 
There is a rich literature on earnings manipulation practices and financial accounting 
choices of bank holding companies. Early studies show that banks have incentives to meet 
regulatory capital requirements and earnings targets, and to reduce taxes. The objectives can be 
achieved by managing accruals such as loan loss provisions, loan charge-offs, security gains and 
losses or adjusting investment strategies (Moyer 1990, Scholes et al. 1990, Collins et al. 1995, 
Beatty et al. 1995, Ahmed et al. 1999, Beatty and Harris 1999, Beatty et al. 2002). Banks have an 
incentive to manipulate earnings because accounting earnings convey firm information to 
investors and play an important role in firm performance evaluation and accounting-based 
contracting (Warfield et al. 1995).  
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Although the earnings management incentive exists in the entire banking industry, there 
is variation across different types of banks. Some studies find that public banks have greater 
incentive to manipulate earnings and engage in more earnings management. Beatty and Harris 
(1999) find that public banks engage in more earnings manipulation through security gains and 
losses than private banks. The authors argue that banks manage earnings not only in response to 
regulatory requirements, but also to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry. Beatty et al. 
(2002) provide evidence that public banks report more small earnings increases than private 
banks. The authors further show that public banks are more likely to use loan loss provisions and 
security gains and losses to avoid earnings decreases than private banks. Alternatively, prior 
studies show that public banks demand higher level verifiable accounting information so that 
they are able to recognize losses more timely than gains. Nichols et al. (2009) compare public 
banks and private banks in terms of conservative accounting and provide evidence that public 
banks exhibit greater conditional conservatism. In addition, prior research finds that banks’ 
incentive to manage earnings is linked to managers’ compensation. Dechow et al. (2010) show 
that managers have a compensation incentive to manipulate securitization gains under SFAS 140. 
Among the research on financial reporting in the banking industry, some studies 
specifically examine discretionary choice on loan loss provisions which are an important accrual 
of bank holding companies. The studies find that loan loss provisions can be decomposed into a 
component which can be predicted and another component which is subject to managerial 
discretion. The market prices these two components differently (Beaver and Engel 1996). 
Wahlen (1994) finds a positive association between discretionary loan loss provisions and future 
cash flow increases after controlling for the unexpected change in non-performing loans and 
unexpected loan charge-offs.  Beaver and Engel (1996) also find a positive association between 
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discretionary loan loss provisions and stock returns, supporting the signaling effect of 
discretionary loan loss provisions. Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) find that auditor expertise drives 
the positive market reactions, suggesting that investors perceive discretionary loan loss 
provisions disclosed by banks to convey more valuable information when the bank is audited by 
specialists in the banking industry. 
Banks have various incentives to manage loan loss provisions. Prior research provides 
evidence that banks use loan loss provisions to manage capital (Kim and Kross 1998; Ahmed et 
al. 1999) and to smooth earnings (Kanagaretnam et al. 2003). Lobo and Yang (2001) jointly test 
the signaling effect, capital management effect and earnings management effect of loan loss 
provisions. Their findings suggest that the income smoothing effect is supported by all the 
models but the signaling effect is sensitive to different model specifications.   
3.2 Fair value accounting 
There has been a long-lived debate over fair value accounting. Early studies primarily 
focus on the value relevance of fair value disclosure. Barth (1994) provides evidence that the fair 
value of investment securities provides incremental power in explaining stock returns compared 
with historical book value. Barth et al. (1995) examine fair value based earnings and regulatory 
capital measures under SFAS 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity 
Securities. They find that fair value based earnings are more volatile and banks under fair value 
accounting violate regulatory capital requirements more frequently. Both Nelson (1996) and 
Barth et al. (1996) study the value relevance of fair value estimates under SFAS 107, Disclosures 
about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, but find conflicting results. Nelson (1996) shows that 
fair value measures are value irrelevant after controlling for future profitability while Barth et al. 
(1996) include non-performing loans and interest-sensitive assets and liabilities as control 
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variables and find the opposite results. Liang and Riedl (2011) examine the impact of fair value 
accounting on analyst forecasts. They find that UK firms have more accurate net asset value 
forecasts based on firm-supplied fair values while US firms have more accurate EPS forecasts 
based on historical cost reporting. Blankespoor et al. (2013) show that leverage ratios using fair 
value information better explain banks credit risk which is measured by bond spread and bank 
failure.   
The recent issuance of SFAS 157 Fair Value Measurements as well as the financial crisis 
in 2008-2009 provoked a large amount of research on fair value accounting based on the fair 
value disclosure requirements and recommendations under SFAS 157. Song et al. (2010) find 
that level 1 and level 2 fair values are more value relevant than level 3 fair values. In addition, 
good governance increases the value relevance of fair values, especially level 3 fair values. Riedl 
and Serafeim (2011) document a higher cost of capital for financial institutions with more level 3 
fair value assets. They also find that the differences in cost of capital across the three levels of 
fair value assets are smaller for financial institutions which have better information environments. 
Liao et al. (2010) document a positive association between information asymmetry, measured by 
the bid-ask spread, and both fair value net assets and loan loss provisions during the financial 
crisis. 
Researchers have expressed concerns that fair value measurements described in SFAS 
157 give managers more discretion over asset and liability valuation and fair values are more 
difficult and costly to audit (Benston 2008). Ryan (2008) argues that it is hard to implement the 
fair value measurements described in SFAS 157 during the subprime crisis. Martin et al. (2006) 
conclude from a stream of judgment and decision-making research that there are unintentional 
and intentional biases when managers prepare fair values. Specific knowledge and skills are 
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required but very difficult to gain in order to audit fair values. In response to these concerns, 
recent studies examine how fair value measurements in SFAS 157 affect earnings manipulation 
and auditing. Fiechter and Meyer (2010) find that banks take a big bath via level 3 unrealized 
gains and losses during the financial crisis. Ettredge et al. (2010) examine the impact of fair 
value measurements on audit fees. They find that fair value assets, especially level 3 assets, 
increase audit fees. Chen et al. (2010) study the relation between fair value measurements and 
loan loss provisions but fail to find a direct association. Heflin and Valencia (2012) examine 
managerial discretion over level 3 estimates under SFAS 157. They do not find evidence of 
capital management through level 3 fair values but provide evidence that banks manage level 3 
inputs to exceed zero and prior quarter earnings. Contrary to their results, I find a positive 
association between level 2 fair values and reporting small earnings increases but no significant 
association between level 3 fair values and reporting small earnings increases.  
There are two concurrent studies which are most related to this paper. Bratten et al. (2012) 
examine the association between the magnitude of fair value reporting and bank earnings 
management through discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and 
losses. Their results show that bank holding companies with more fair value reporting rely more 
on discretionary security gains and losses than discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth 
earnings. Further, they show that banks whose auditors are industry specialists are less likely to 
manage earnings.  Barth et al. (2012) provide evidence that banks use gains on available-for-sale 
assets to smooth earnings and capital. In addition, they find that banks’ holding available-for-sale 
assets are related to banks’ earnings management through realized gains and losses on available-
for-sale assets. In other words, the more available-for-sales assets a bank holds, the greater 
“opportunity” that a bank uses realized gains and losses to smooth earnings. My study is similar 
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to these papers in that it also examines the association between fair value accounting and bank 
earnings management, however, my study is different in the following ways: 1) The scope of fair 
value assets and liabilities in my study is different. Bratten et al. (2012) consider all assets and 
liabilities both recognized at fair value on balance sheets and disclosed at fair value in the 
footnotes. Barth et al. (2012) only studies available-for-sale assets.  I focus on fair value assets 
and liabilities recognized and reported on balance sheets. SFAS 157 requires disclosure on inputs 
of fair value assets and liabilities recognized in the consolidated balance sheet, but not on inputs 
of assets and liabilities for which the fair values are disclosed in the footnote.4 For example, 
held-to-maturity assets are reported at their amortized costs and their fair values are disclosed in 
the footnote. Therefore, the fair value variables in this study do not include the fair values of 
held-to-maturity assets. Ryan (2007) mentions that “gains trading is generally not possible using 
HTM securities, because these securities cannot be sold without giving up the right to classify 
securities as HTM…” (Ryan 2007, p.152); 2) they focus on income smoothing while I proxy for 
earnings management with beating prior year earnings benchmarks; 3) the sample period in my 
study is more recent because one of my research objectives is to examine the impact of different 
levels of fair value on earnings management based on the fair value hierarchy in SFAS 157; 4) I 
also examine changes in fair values on other types of assets and liabilities, eg. trading assets, 
assets and liabilities recognized for fair value options. Compared to Barth et al (2012), this paper 
has incremental contribution by providing evidence that banks engage in earnings management 
through level 2 available-for-sale assets, not level 1 or level 3 available-for-sale assets.   
Motivated by the critiques and concerns regarding fair value measurements described in 
SFAS 157 (Benston 2008, Ryan 2008, Martin et al. 2006), this study follows the two streams of 
                                                 
4 SFAS 157 mentions that “The reporting entity is encouraged, but not required, to combine the fair value information disclosed 
under this Statement with the fair value information disclosed under other accounting pronouncements.” (SFAS157, p.13 
paragraph 35)   
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research reviewed above to examine the impact of fair value measurements defined in SFAS 157 
on earnings management, proxied by reporting small earnings increases (Beatty et al. 2002), 
controlling for discretionary loan loss provisions, discretionary security gains and losses as well 
as other bank-specific characteristics. Especially, I argue that managers are more likely to 
manipulate earnings through level 2 fair values because of the higher dollar values and less 
extensive disclosure for level 2 fair values. I express the testable hypotheses in this study as 
follows: 
H1: Banks reporting higher fair values are more likely to report small earnings increases, 
controlling for discretionary loan loss provisions, discretionary security gains and losses as 
well as other bank-specific characteristics. 
H2: Banks reporting higher level 2 fair values are more likely to report small earnings 
increases, controlling for discretionary loan loss provisions, discretionary security gains 
and losses as well as other bank-specific characteristics. 
 
4. Research design and sample selection 
In this section, I discuss the research methodology, variable construction and the sample 
selection procedure.   
4.1 Discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses 
I use the following models to estimate the discretionary loan loss provisions and 
discretionary security gains and losses, which are similar to the models in Beatty et al. (2002).   
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  
                                                                                                                                                  (1)      
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𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                 (2)          
Definition of all variables is presented in appendix A.  
According to prior research, I expect that the loan loss provisions are increasing in bank 
size (Beatty et al. 2002), change in nonperforming loans (Wahlen 1994; Beaver and Engel 1996; 
Ahmed et al. 1999; Lobo and Yang 2001; Beatty et al. 2002; Kanagaretnam et al. 2009) and loan 
size (Wahlen 1994; Beaver and Engel 1996; Beatty et al. 2002). I also expect that the realized 
security gains and losses are increasing in the total security gains and losses (Beatty and Harris 
1999, Beatty et al 2002). The residual estimated from equation (1) is the discretionary 
component of loan loss provisions. The residual estimated from equation (2) is the discretionary 
component of security gains and losses. The residuals are used in the logistic regression analysis. 
4.2 Fair value measurements 
I use the following two logistic regression models to test the association between fair 
value measurements on the probability that a bank reports small increases in return on assets.   
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐷𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           
                                                                                                                                                   (3)                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐿1𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿2𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿3𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6∆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7∆𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽12∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐷𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                      (4)                                                                                                                                                                                 
Definition of all variables is presented in the appendix A.5  
                                                 
5 The dependent variable ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm’s ΔROA is between 0 and 0.0014, and 
zero otherwise; where ΔROA is calculated as net income at year t minus net income at year t-1, divided by total assets at year t-2. 
17 
 
 
 
The two regression models above are variations of the model in Beatty et al. (2002) and 
include variables for fair value measurements. Equation (3) tests the overall impact of total fair 
values. In additional tests, I test equation (3) with FV replaced by a dichotomous variable HFV. I 
test equation (4) with L1FV, L2FV and L3FV replaced by dichotomous variables L1HFV, L2HFV 
and L3HFV. I expect that the coefficient of FV or HFV is positive and significant, suggesting that 
banks reporting high fair values on their balance sheet are more likely to report small earnings 
increases.  
Equation (4) tests the impact of the three fair value levels separately. According to the 
fair value hierarchy, the inputs of level 1 fair value assets and liabilities are directly observable 
from active markets, implying that managers have little discretion when valuing level 1 fair 
value assets and liabilities. Hence, I expect that level 1 fair value assets and liabilities will have 
not have a significant impact on earnings management. In contrast, managers use inputs 
indirectly observed from inactive markets or use internal models and assumptions when they 
value level 2 and level 3 assets and liabilities, implying that managers have more discretion over 
level 2 and level 3 fair value measures. Hence, I expect that the coefficient of L2FV or L2HFV is 
positive and significant. Although managers have discretion over level 3 fair values, banks may 
not be able to manage earnings effectively through level 3 fair values. First, banks usually report 
small dollar amounts of level 3 fair value assets and liabilities, implying that banks have limited 
room to manipulate earnings through level 3 fair values. Second, SFAS157 requires more 
detailed disclosure in level 3 fair values which restrains managerial incentive to manipulate 
earnings through level 3 fair values. Therefore, I do not predict the direction of the coefficient on 
the level 3 fair value variable.  
                                                                                                                                                             
The independent variable 𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 is calculated as total assets and liabilities reported at fair value at year t divided by the total assets 
at year t-1. So any change in total fair value assets and liabilities would not affect the value of ΔROA through the denominator. 
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For banks which manipulate earnings to beat prior year earnings targets, they are more 
likely to undercharge loan loss provisions. Thus, I expect that there is a negative association 
between discretionary loan loss provisions and the probability that a bank reports small earnings 
increases. Following Beatty et al. (2002), I also control for bank type, change in bank size, 
change in cash flow, change in nonperforming loans and change in loan size. In additional tests, I 
also control for realized security gains and losses to test if the loading of available-for-sale assets 
is partially due to the realized security gains and losses on available-for-sale assets. Finally, I 
include year dichotomous variables to control for the time fixed effects. I also adjust for firm-
level clustering when estimating the standard errors.  
4.3 Data and sample selection  
Table 1 Panel A shows the sample selection procedure. The initial sample contains all 
domestic bank holding companies from the Bank Holding Company Database maintained by 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago during the period 2005-2012. The Bank Holding Company 
Data includes financial information of bank holding companies filed in the form FR Y-9C. SFAS 
157 was effective for financial statements which are issued for the fiscal year beginning on and 
after November 5, 2007 (SFAS 157). I chose the initial sample year from 2005 to calculate 
change in ROA starting from the year 2007. The initial sample includes 43,945 bank-year 
observations for 7,061 unique banks. I require the sample companies to have necessary financial 
data to calculate discretionary loan loss provisions, discretionary security gains and losses as 
well as change in ROA.  The sample at this stage has 5,311 bank-years for 1,147 banks6. I use 
this sample to calculate the bin width when examining the distributions of change in return on 
                                                 
6 The primary reason of data loss is that many basic financial data items have missing values in the original database. For 
example, among 43,945 bank-year observations, only 9,409 observations have available total assets (BHCK2170), net income 
(BHCK4340), net loans (BHCK2122), loan loss reserve (BHCKB522), loan loss provisions (BHCK4230), realized gains and 
losses on available-for-sale securities (BHCK3196) and realized gains and losses on held-to-maturity securities (BHCK3521).   
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assets.7 Then I exclude all bank-year observations with missing data on fair value assets and fair 
value liabilities. I found that many banks do not report fair value assets and liabilities in the year 
2007 and 2008. This is because Schedule HC-Q Financial Assets and Liabilities Measured at 
Fair Value is required to be completed by all bank holding companies since 2009.8 In order to 
mitigate the self-selection issue, I deleted observations in the year 2007 and 2008. Finally, I 
removed banks with missing years from 2009 to 2012.9  The final sample consists of 2,896 bank-
year observations for 724 unique banks.  
            Table 1 Panel B presents the distributions of banks across years for the high fair value 
group and the low fair value group.  The final sample is a balanced panel. There are 724 
observations in each year, including 362 observations in the high fair value group and 362 
observations in the low fair value group.  
Insert Table 1 
Table 2 compares the descriptive statistics for fair value variables and control variables 
between the low fair value group and high fair value group. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. In the high fair value group 22.0% of the bank-years report 
small earnings increases while in the low fair value group only 16.1% of the bank-years report 
small earnings increases. The difference is significant at the 1% level. The dichotomous 
variables EM_UP1 and EM_UP2 capture banks that manage earnings upward through 
discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses respectively. The 
dichotomous variables EM_DN1 and EM_DN2 capture banks that manage earnings downward 
through discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses 
                                                 
7 The calculation of bin width is discussed in Section 4.  
8 An example of Schedule HC-Q from FR Y-9C is in the appendix.   
9  I also keep these observations in the sample and the results are qualitatively unchanged.  
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respectively. The percentage of bank-years which manage earnings upward using the two 
methods are significantly higher for the high fair value group (13.6% and 5% respectively) than 
the low fair value group (8% and 2.3% respectively). Although there is not a significant 
difference in the percent of bank-years that manage earnings downward through discretionary 
loan loss provisions between the two groups, there are more bank-years which manage earnings 
downward through discretionary gains and losses for the high fair value group (8.4%) than the 
low fair value group (5%). The earnings volatility is significantly lower for the high fair value 
sample (0.2%) than the low fair value sample (0.3%). In the low fair value group 36.3% of the 
banks are public banks, while in the high fair value group 40% of the banks are public banks. 
The descriptive statistics for the fair value variables show that the high fair value banks measure 
more assets and liabilities at fair value in all three levels than the low fair value banks. I also find 
that level 2 fair values account for the largest component of the total fair value. On average, 
banks report very small amounts of level 3 assets and liabilities. In the high fair value sample, 
fair values increase by 7.9% of the total assets at the beginning of the year while in the low fair 
value sample, fair values increase only by 1.6% of the total assets.  The distribution of fair value 
assets and liabilities in the sample are consistent with other studies on fair value measurements 
(Song et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2010, Bratten et al. 2012).  
On average, high fair value banks have significantly lower discretionary loan loss 
provisions and higher discretionary security gains and losses than the low fair value banks. The 
mean differences are -0.2% of the average loans and 0.02% of total assets respectively. High fair 
value banks have significantly higher realized gains and losses than low fair value banks. The 
results are consistent with the expectation that the high fair value banks are more likely to engage 
in earnings management through discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security 
21 
 
 
 
gains and losses than low fair value banks. Additionally, high fair value banks are larger, 
experience a significantly larger increase in total assets and a larger increase in cash flow than 
the low fair value banks. Lastly, high fair value banks experience smaller decreases in real estate 
loans and commercial loans.  
Insert Table 2 
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1 Composition of fair value assets and liabilities 
I first examine the composition of fair value assets and liabilities in each level. Figure 1 
panel A shows that on average, about 97% of fair values are assets and only 3% of fair values are 
liabilities. Level 2 fair value assets account for about 75% of total fair values, and are the biggest 
component of fair values. The second biggest component is level 1 fair value assets, which 
account for 18% of total fair values. Level 3 fair value assets account for 3% of total fair values, 
respectively. Figure 1 panels B through D present the composition of fair values for each level 
by the type of assets and liabilities. The classification of fair value assets and liabilities are based 
on the Schedule HC-Q in the form FY9-C. For level 1 fair values, the biggest component is 
available-for-sale assets, which accounts for 86% of the level 1 fair value. The second biggest 
component is deposits, which accounts for 6% of the level 1 fair value. For level 2 fair values, 
the largest component is also available-for-sale assets, which accounts for 91% of the level 2 fair 
value. The second and third largest components are trading assets and trading liabilities, which 
account for 3% and 2% of the level 2 fair values respectively. For level 3 fair values, the largest 
component is loans, which accounts for 41% of the level 3 fair value. Figure 1 shows that the 
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largest component of recurring basis fair values is level 2 fair value assets in terms of fair value 
hierarchy and available-for-sale assets in terms of asset type. 
Insert Figure 1 
            Figure 2 presents the growth of fair value assets and liabilities in the three levels from 
2009 to 2012. The average level 2 fair value assets increase from 14% of the total assets in the 
year 2009 to about 18% of the total assets in the year 2012. The average level 1 fair value assets 
decrease slightly from 2009 to 2012. Level 3 fair value assets and three level fair value liabilities 
stay constant across the years.  
Insert Figure 2 
5.2 Earnings change distributions 
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Beatty et al. (2002), I examine the 
distributions of change in return on assets in my sample. The bin width is calculated following 
the approach in Degeorge et al. (1999). They suggest “a bin width positively related to the 
variability of the data and negatively related to the number of observations” (Degeorge et al. 
1999, p. 18). I calculate the bin width as 2M (n-1/3), where M is the sample interquartile range of 
the ∆ROA and n is the sample size. The bin width in this study is 0.0007. Bin(0) indicates an 
earnings change ranges between 0 and 0.0007 and bin(-1) indicates an earnings change ranges 
between -0.0007 and 0. In the logistic regression test, I use twice the bin width to indicate a 
small increase in return on assets. Figure 3 panel A plots the distributions of change in return on 
assets for the low fair value sample (on the top of the panel) and the high fair value sample (on 
the bottom of the panel). There are 1,448 bank-year observations with fair values above the 
median of earnings changes each year and 1,448 bank-year observations with fair values below 
the median. The distribution of the low fair value sample is smoother than the high fair value 
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sample around bin(0). There is a discontinuity of the distribution of ∆ROA around zero for the 
high fair value sample, shown as unexpectedly high frequency of bank-years in bin(0) and 
unexpectedly low frequency of bank-years in bin(-1), but such discontinuity around zero is less 
apparent for the low fair value sample, suggesting that there are a larger proportion of bank-years 
reporting small increases in return on assets for the high fair value sample than the low fair value 
sample.  
Figure 3 panel B compares distributions of ∆ROA between the high level 2 fair value 
banks and the low level 2 fair value banks. Panel C compares distributions of ∆ROA between the 
banks with large amounts of available-for-sale assets and banks with small amounts of available-
for-sale assets. Similar to panel A, there is a larger kink around bin(0) in the distribution of 
earnings changes for the banks with high level 2 fair values or for banks with large amounts of 
available-for-sale assets.   
Panels D and E compare distributions of ∆ROA between the high level 1 (level 3) fair 
value banks and the low level 1 (level 3) fair value banks. It can be observed that the distribution 
of change in return on assets for both subsamples have apparent discontinuities around bin(0), 
indicating that level 1 and level 3 fair values are less likely to be managed to beat prior year 
earnings targets.   
Insert Figure 3 
5.3 Univariate tests 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among main variables used in the 
logistic regression models. The correlation between ∆ROAINC and FV is 0.062 and significant at 
the 1% level. The correlation between ∆ROAINC and HFV is 0.076 and significant at the 1% 
level. ∆ROAINC is positively correlated with L2FV and L2HFV. The correlation coefficients are 
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0.095 and 0.062 respectively and both are significant at the 1% level. The correlations between 
DLLP and ∆ROAINC are significantly negative (-0.075) implying that low discretionary loan 
loss provisions are correlated with small earnings increases. The variables FV, L2FV, HFV, and 
L2HFV are negatively correlated with DLLP and positively correlated with DRSGL and RSGL, 
suggesting that high fair value banks, especially high level 2 fair value banks are more likely to 
inflate earnings through discretionary loan loss provisions, discretionary security gains and 
losses and realized security gains and losses.  
Insert Table 3 
Table 4 reports standardized differences in bin(-1) and bin(0) between the high fair value 
sample and the low fair value sample, similar to the analysis in Beatty et al. (2002).10 The 
standardized difference in bin(-1) is more negative for the high fair value sample (-4.094) than 
the low fair value sample (-3.717) and the standardized difference in bin(0) is significantly more 
positive for the high fair value sample (4.692) than the low fair value sample (2.385). The 
standardized difference in bin(-1) is more negative for the high level 2 fair value sample (-4.075) 
than the low level 2 fair value sample (-3.835) and the standardized difference in bin(0) is 
significantly more positive for the high level 2 fair value sample (5.070) than the low fair value 
sample (1.986). The standardized difference in bin(-1) is more negative for the sample with more 
available-for-sale assets (-4.179) than the sample with less available-for-sale assets (-3.776) and 
the standardized difference in bin(0) is significantly more positive for the sample with more 
available-for-sale assets (5.294) than the sample with less available-for-sale assets (1.597). The 
results above show that there are unexpectedly more bank-years reporting small earnings 
increases and unexpectedly less bank-years reporting small earnings decreases in the high fair 
                                                 
10 Standardized difference of a bin is calculated as the difference between the actual frequency of bank-years observed in a bin 
and the expected frequency of bank-years in a bin divided by the standard deviation of the differences. The expected frequency of 
bank-years in a bin is the average of the frequencies in the bin on the left and the bin on the right.   
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value sample, high level 2 fair value sample and the sample with more available-for-sale assets 
than in the low fair value sample, low level 2 fair value sample and the sample with less 
available-for-sale assets. Panels D and F show that the standardized differences in bin(-1) and in 
bin(0) are not different between the high level 1(level 3) fair value sample and the low level 
1(level 3) fair value sample.   
Table 4 panel F tests the significance of kinks around bin(0) shown in figure 3. I calculate 
the kink as the difference in percent of bank-years between bin(0) and bin(-1).11 A larger number 
indicates a bigger kink. The difference in percent of bank-years between bin(0) and bin(-1) is 
6.96% for the high fair value subsample, which is significantly higher than the difference in 
percent for the low fair value subsample. In other words, the kink around bin(0) of the high fair 
value banks is significantly bigger than the kink for the low fair value banks. Similarly, the kinks 
around bin(0) of the high level 2 fair value banks and banks with more available-for-sale assets 
are significantly bigger than the kinks of the low level 2 fair value banks and banks with less 
available-for-sale assets. In contrast, there is no significant difference between the kink around 
bin(0) for the high level 1(level 3) fair value banks and the kink of low level 1(level 3) fair value 
banks. Taken together, we observe more bank-years just beating prior year earnings targets in the 
subsample with high fair values, high level 2 fair values and more available-for-sale assets.  
Insert Table 4 
5.4 Multivariate tests 
5.4.1 Discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses 
The estimation results of discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security 
gains and losses are presented in table 5. The second column presents the estimation result of 
                                                 
11 I calculate this difference for each two adjacent bins. The significance of a kink around zero is calculated as the difference in 
percent of bank-years between bin(0) and bin(-1) divided by the standard deviation of the differences.  
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discretionary loan loss provisions. The model has an adjusted R-square equal to 41.8%. Loan 
loss provisions can be predicted by factors such as bank size, change in nonperforming loans, 
loan loss reserves at the beginning of the year, and size for different types of loans. The 
coefficients on ∆NPL and LLR are 0.209 and 0.721 (p<0.001), suggesting that banks which 
increase nonperforming loans during the year and have a large loan loss reserve at the beginning 
of the year report larger loan loss provisions. Loan loss provisions are also positively and 
significantly associated with bank size. The third column presents the estimation result of 
discretionary security gains and losses. The model has an adjusted R-square equal to 21.3%. The 
coefficient of total security gains and losses is positive and significant at the 1% level. Overall, 
the estimated results are consistent with discretionary loan loss provision models and 
discretionary security gains and losses models in prior research (e.g., Beatty and Harris 1999; 
Beatty et al. 2002; Beaver and Engel 1996).  
Insert Table 5 
5.4.2  The association between small earnings increases and fair value measurements 
Table 6 reports the logistic regression results of the likelihood of reporting small earnings 
increases on fair value variables. The dependent variable ∆ROAINC is equal to 1 if ∆ROA of a 
bank falls between 0 (inclusive) and 0.0014 (exclusive), and 0 otherwise. There are 2,896 bank-
year observations used in the regressions, including 552 observations with ∆ROA in the interval 
[0, 0.0014) and 2,344 observations outside the interval. In the first model, the estimated 
coefficient on FV is positive (𝛽2 = 0.972) and significant (p = 0.011), suggesting that banks 
reporting more fair value assets and liabilities are more likely to report small earnings increases. 
This finding supports the first hypothesis. The coefficient on ∆NPL is negative (𝛽6 = -14.007) 
and significant (p = 0.000), suggesting that banks which increase nonperforming loans are less 
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likely to report small earnings increases. Banks which increase real estate loans are more likely 
to report small earnings increases, consistent with the notion that banks which increase real 
estate loans are more likely to manage earnings during the financial crisis. DLLP is negatively 
(𝛽13 = -17.470) and significantly (p<0.001) associated with the likelihood that a bank reports 
small earnings increases, which is consistent with the notion that banks manage earnings upward 
to avoid earnings decline by charging lower discretionary loan loss provisions (Beatty et al. 
2002).   
In the second model, I examine the impact of the three levels of fair values separately. 
The pseudo R-square is 7.2%. The coefficient on L1FV is positive but insignificant, consistent 
with the contention that managers have little discretion over level 1 fair values because the inputs 
of level 1 assets and liabilities are directly observable from active markets. Consistent with my 
second hypothesis, the coefficient on L2FV is positive (𝛽3 = 1.868) and significant (p = 0.000), 
indicating that banks reporting large level 2 fair value assets and liabilities are more likely to 
manage earnings to avoid earnings declines. The coefficient on L3FV is negative and 
insignificant (𝛽4 = -4.382). Level 3 fair values account for a very small proportion of the total 
fair values, so the positive association between small earnings increases and total fair values is 
likely driven by the level 2 fair values. Similar to the first model, ∆NPL and DLLP are both 
negative and significantly associated with the likelihood that a bank reports small earnings 
increases (𝛽8 = -14.153, 𝛽15 = -16.849). The coefficient of ∆LOANR is positive and significant at 
the 1% level.  
            In model 3, I replace FV with a dummy variable HFV. In model 4, I replace L1FV, L2FV 
and L3FV with three dichotomous variables L1HFV, L2HFV and L3HFV. The results are 
qualitatively unchanged. The results in table 6 indicate that banks which report larger fair value 
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assets and liabilities, especially larger level 2 fair value assets and liabilities, are more likely to 
manage earnings in terms of reporting small earnings increases, after controlling for 
discretionary loan loss provisions, discretionary security gains and losses, and other bank-
specific characteristics.  
Insert Table 6 
            Change in fair value of some assets may affect future earnings, e.g., available-for-sale 
assets. Table 7 presents the logistic regression results of small earnings increases one-year ahead 
on fair value variables. Similar to table 6, coefficients on L2FV, HFV and L2HFV are positive 
and significant. The coefficient on FV is positive and insignificant. In panel B, coefficients on 
RSGL are positive and significant, suggesting that realized security gains and losses are 
positively associated with small earnings increases one-year ahead.  
Insert Table 7 
            Table 8 and table 9 document the logistic regression results of small earnings increases in 
the current year and one-year ahead on changes in fair value assets and liabilities. Changes in fair 
values capture both changes in assets and liabilities reported at fair value and changes in fair 
values of the incumbent assets and liabilities. The variable ΔFV is defined as change in total fair 
value of assets and liabilities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the prior year. The 
variables ΔL1FV, ΔL2FV and ΔL3FV are calculated as change in fair value assets and liabilities 
in each level divided by total assets at the beginning of the prior year. Overall, change in fair 
values is positively and significantly associated with small earnings increases in the current year. 
Change in level 2 fair values is positively and significantly associated with small earnings 
increases both in the current year and one-year ahead. The results suggest that banks reporting 
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increases in fair values, especially increases level 2 fair values, are more likely to report small 
earnings increases both in the current year and one-year ahead.  
Insert Table 8 
Insert Table 9 
            In table 10 and table 11, I examine the association between small earnings increases and 
different types of fair value assets and liabilities. Starting from the year 2009, all banks are 
required to complete Schedule HC-Q, Financial Assets and Liabilities Measured at Fair Value of 
the call form. Banks need to report the dollar amount in loans, trading assets, available-for-sale 
assets, Federal funds securities, deposits, trading liabilities, loan commitments, and all other 
assets and liabilities are reported at fair value. Based on the reporting requirement of Schedule 
HC-Q, I classify fair value assets into five categories: loans, trading assets, available for sale 
assets, Fed funds purchased, and all other assets. I classify fair value liabilities into three 
categories: deposits, trading liabilities, and other liabilities. For each category within each level, I 
calculate the percentage of total assets reported at fair value. In table 10, I control for 
discretionary security gains and losses and realized security gains and losses respectively. In 
table 11, I decompose realized security gains and losses into the portion on available-for-sale 
assets and the other portion on held-to-maturity assets. The most interesting result documented in 
table 10 and table 11 is that level 2 available-for-sales assets are positively and significantly 
associated with small earnings increases in both the current year and one-year ahead. This result 
shows that the positive association between level 2 fair values and small earnings increases is 
primarily driven by available-for-sale assets. This result is consistent with the evidence provided 
in Barth et al. (2012). In addition, coefficients on L2TRADEA are positive and significant at the 1% 
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level in the models of one-year ahead small earnings increases, which provides evidence that 
banks beat prior year earnings targets by managing change in the fair value of trading assets.  
            In order to test if the positive effect of available-for-sale assets is associated with realized 
gains and losses on available-for-sale assets, I decompose realized gains and losses into realized 
gains and losses on available-for-sale assets and realized gains and losses on held-to-maturity 
assets. Then I compared the factor loading of RSGL_AFS with and without L2AFS in the model. 
The results are documented in table 11. The first two models show that when the dependent 
variable is small earnings increases in the current year, the coefficient on RSGL_AFS increases 
from 16.553 to 40.054 and the p-value decreases from 0.543 to 0.167. The last two models show 
that when the dependent variable is small earnings increases one-year ahead, the coefficient on 
RSGL_AFS increases from 40.486 to 55.411 and the p-value decreases from 0.175 to 0.075 
(significant at the 10% level). The results imply that the positive effect of level 2 available-for-
sale assets is partially associated with realized gains and losses on available-for-sale assets.  
Insert Table 10 
Insert Table 11 
5.5 Additional tests 
5.5.1 Earnings management through discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary 
security gains and losses 
In the additional tests, I first compare the discretionary accounting choices of bank-year 
observations with small changes in return on assets before DLLP or DRSGL between the high 
fair value sample and the low fair value sample, similar to Beatty et al. (2002). The univariate 
test results are presented in table 12. Panel A compares the discretionary loan loss provisions of 
bank-years which have small earnings changes before DLLP between the two groups. In the high 
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fair value sample, there are 138 bank-year observations with small negative earnings changes, 
defined as ∆ROA before DLLP in bin(-2) and bin(-1), and 136 bank-year observations with small 
positive earnings changes, defined as ∆ROA before DLLP in bin(0) and bin(1). In the low fair 
value sample, there are 111 bank-year observations with small negative earnings changes and 
139 bank-year observations with small positive earnings changes.  
In the high fair value sample, the bank-years with small negative earnings changes before 
DLLP (left top cell) have more negative discretionary loan loss provisions on average than the 
bank-years with small positive earnings changes before DLLP (right top cell). The mean values 
are significantly different at the 1% level. In the low fair value sample, the bank-years with small 
negative earnings changes before DLLP (left bottom cell) have smaller discretionary loan loss 
provisions on average than the bank-years with small positive earnings changes before DLLP 
(right bottom cell), however the mean values are not significantly different. For the bank-year 
observations with small negative earnings changes before DLLP, the high fair value group (left 
top cell) experiences more negative discretionary loan loss provisions on average than the low 
fair value group (left bottom cell). The mean values of DLLP are -0.0026 and -0.0006 
respectively and the t-statistic of the difference is significant at the 5% level.  For the bank-year 
observations with small positive earnings changes before DLLP, the mean DLLP of the high fair 
value banks (right top cell) is not significantly different from the low fair value banks (right 
bottom cell).   
Table 12 panel B documents the results of the same analysis for discretionary security 
gains and losses. In the high fair value sample, there are 155 bank-year observations with small 
negative earnings changes, defined as ∆ROA before DRSGL in bin(-2) and bin(-1), and 218 
bank-year observations with small positive earnings changes, defined as ∆ROA before DRSGL in 
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bin(0) and bin(1). In the low fair value sample, there are 136 bank-year observations with small 
negative earnings changes and 196 bank-year observations with small positive earnings changes 
DRSGL. In the high fair value sample, the bank-years with small negative earnings changes 
before DRSGL (left top cell) have larger discretionary security gains and losses on average than 
the bank-years with small positive earnings changes before DRSGL (right top cell). The mean 
values are significantly different at the 1% level. For the bank-year observations with small 
negative earnings changes before DRSGL, the high fair value group (left top cell) has larger 
discretionary security gains and losses on average than the low fair value group (left bottom cell). 
The mean values of DRSGL are 0.0004 and 0.0000 respectively and the t-statistic of the 
difference is significant at the 5% level.  For the bank-year observations with small positive 
earnings changes before DRSGL, the high fair value group (right top cell) is insignificantly 
different from the low fair value group (right bottom cell) in terms of discretionary security gains 
and losses.   
In summary, the results in table 12 show that the high fair value banks are more likely to 
manage earnings upward by choosing more negative discretionary loan loss provisions and more 
positive discretionary security gains and losses than the low fair value banks. 
Insert Table 12 
5.5.2 Upward earnings management and downward earnings management 
Earnings management has two directions. Banks missing the earnings targets before 
earnings management have incentives to inflate earnings to beat the targets while other banks 
that have already met the targets have an incentive to deflate earnings to save for the next period 
(Degeorge et al. 1999). In table 13, I examine whether the upward and downward earnings 
management are associated with high fair values. In the first two models, I use two dichotomous 
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variables to further capture bank-years which are most likely to manage earnings upward. I 
define a new variable EM_UP1 to equal one if a bank reports negative earnings changes before 
DLLP (∆ROA<0),  and reports small positive earnings changes after DLLP (0≤ ∆ROA<0.0014), 
and zero otherwise. Similarly, the dependent variable in the second model EM_UP2 is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a bank has an earnings decrease before DRSGL and reports a 
small earnings increase after DRSGL, and zero otherwise. In the third model, the dependent 
variable EM_DN1 is an indicator variable equal to one if a bank has large earnings increases 
before DLLP (∆ROA>=0.0014) but reports small earnings increases after DLLP (0≤ 
∆ROA<0.0014), and zero otherwise. In the last model,  the dependent variable EM_DN2 is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a bank has large earnings increases before DRSGL but reports 
small earnings increases after DRSGL, and zero otherwise. I replace ∆ROAINC with EM and re-
do the multivariate analyses. 
Table 13 presents the logistic regression results of both upward earnings management and 
downward earnings management on fair value measurements. The pseudo-R squares range from 
13.2% to 18.8%. In the first two models, the coefficients on L2FV are positive (𝛽 = 2.140 and 
2.696 respectively) and significant at the 1% level. Neither L1FV nor L3FV has a significant 
coefficient. In the third model, the coefficients on L1FV and L2FV are insignificant and the 
coefficient on L3FV is negative and significant at the 5% level. In the last model, the coefficient 
on L2HFV is positive and significant at the 1% level. The results in table 13 suggest that banks 
which report high level 2 fair values are more likely to manage earnings upward or to manage 
earnings downward through discretionary security gains and losses.  
Insert Table 13 
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5.5.3 Public banks and private banks 
Public banks have an incentive to manage earnings because markets penalize those firms 
which miss earnings targets. Private banks may also have an incentive to beat earnings targets in 
order to secure contracts or to reduce their financing cost. In table 6, I control for different types 
of banks but do not find a significant difference between public banks and private banks in terms 
of reporting small earnings increases. In table 14, I examine the association between small 
earnings increases and fair value variables in the subsample of public banks and in the subsample 
of private banks separately. The results are similar to the main results. The coefficients on L2FV 
and L2HFV are positive and significant in both public banks and private banks, which suggests 
that the positive association between fair values and small earnings increases is not driven by the 
difference between public banks and private banks. This is consistent with Barth et al. (2012) 
which finds earnings management and capital management in both listed and non-listed banks.  
Insert Table 14 
5.5.4 Net changes in fair values included in earnings for banks which elect fair value options 
I examine the factors which determine the net changes in fair values recognized in 
earnings. Per FR Y-9C, bank holding companies are required to report net gains or losses 
recognized in earnings if they elect to account for assets and liabilities under a fair value option 
(SFAS 159). The amounts reflect “reported interest included in interest income and revaluation 
adjustment included in noninterest income” (Instructions for Preparation of Reporting Form FR 
Y-9C, p. HI-27). The assets and liabilities elected to be reported at fair value under a fair value 
option do not include those assets and liabilities which are required to be recognized at fair value 
in other accounting standards. For example, Wells Fargo and Company elected fair value option 
to measure certain mortgages held for sale, loans, and consolidated VIEs in the year 2012. Assets 
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and liabilities such as trading assets and available-for-sale securities are regulated in SFAS 115, 
so they are excluded from fair value assets and liabilities under a fair value option. In my sample, 
only 324 bank-years elected the fair value option and recognized gains and losses in earnings. 
The variable NCFV is the net gains or losses on assets and liabilities reported in Schedule HI 
divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year. The mean value of NCFV is 0.02% and 
the maximum value of NCFV is only 1.4%. Table 15 presents the logistic regression results of 
small earnings increases on fair value variables in a subsample of 324 bank-years which elect the 
fair value option. None of the fair value variables is significant.12  Table 16 presents the OLS 
regression results of net changes in fair values. The independent variable IBFV is the earnings 
before net changes in fair values, measured as net income minus net changes in fair values 
divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. The independent variable CAPITAL_FVO is 
total risk-based capital before net change in fair values deflated by total assets at the beginning of 
the year. I include CAPITAL_FVO in the model to examine whether net changes in fair values 
are associated with capital management. Other variables are defined as before. The adjusted R-
square is 17.5%.  The coefficient on IBFV is -0.035 and significant at the 5% level, suggesting 
that banks with lower earnings before NCFV would recognize larger NCFV into earnings and 
banks with higher earnings before NCFV would recognize smaller NCFV into earnings. This 
result suggests that the net changes in fair values recognized in earnings under fair value options 
are used to smooth earnings. Level 2 fair value assets are positively associated with NCFV, while 
fair value liabilities are negatively associated with NCFV. Discretionary loan loss provisions are 
negatively associated with NCFV, suggesting that fair values and discretionary loan loss 
                                                 
12 I manually collected level 3 gains and losses from 10Ks for 276 public banks in 2009-2012. There are 475 bank-years with 
nonzero level 3 gains and losses. I test the association between small earnings increases and fair value measurements in a 
subsample of these 475 bank-years. The coefficient on L3HFV is negative and significant at 1% level. Overall fair value variables 
and level 2 fair value variables are all insignificant.  
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provisions are complementary techniques to manage earnings. The coefficient on 
CAPITAL_FVO is insignificant, implying that net changes in fair values are not significantly 
associated with capital management. Table 15 and table 16 together suggest that bank-years 
which elect fair value options manage change in fair values to smooth earnings; however, they 
cannot explain the phenomenon of beating prior year earnings targets.13 
Insert Table 15 
Insert Table 16 
5.5.5 Bank-years which recognize non-zero realized gains and losses on available-for-sale assets 
Table 17 documents the logistic regression results in a subsample of bank-years which 
recognize non-zero realized gains and losses on available-for-sale assets. The results are similar 
to the main test results in table 6. The coefficients on L2FV, L2HFV and ΔL2FV are 2.186, 0.330 
and 2.117. They are all significant at 1% level.  
Insert Table 17 
5.5.6 Association between earnings volatility and fair value variables 
            Finally, I examine the association between reported earnings volatility and fair value 
measurements. The dependent variable Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of 
quarterly ROA from 2009 to 2012 for each bank. This variable is regressed on bank type, fair 
value variables, bank size and bank leverage. I expect that banks measuring more assets and 
liabilities at fair value, especially level 2 fair values, report smoother earnings. Therefore, I 
expect that the coefficient on FV, L2FV, HFV and L2HFV are negative and significant. The 
results show that FV, L2FV, HFV and L2HFV are negatively and significantly associated with 
earnings volatility, consistent with my prediction. The coefficients on L3FV and L3HFV are 
                                                 
13 This could be due to the small sample size and small magnitude of net changes in fair values included in earnings. The 
likelihood ratios of the regressions are small and p-values show that the overall models are insignificant in this small sample.  
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positive and significant, suggesting that banks reporting more level 3 fair value assets and 
liabilities have more volatile earnings  
Insert Table 18 
6. Conclusions 
This study examines the association between fair value measurements and earnings 
management using regulatory financial data from 2009 to 2012 for a sample of U.S. public and 
private bank holding companies. Following the methodology in Beatty et al. (2002), I find that 
banks recognizing more recurring basis fair value assets and liabilities, especially more level 2 
fair value assets and liabilities and banks reporting increased level 2 fair value assets and 
liabilities are more likely to report small earnings increases after controlling for discretionary 
loan loss provisions, discretionary security gains and losses, and other bank-specific 
characteristics. By decomposing fair values into different types, I find that banks recognizing 
large amounts of available-for-sale assets are more likely to report small earnings increases. This 
association is partially driven by realized gains and losses on available-for-sale assets. I also 
distinguish upward earnings management from downward earnings management. The results 
show that level 2 fair values are positively associated with both upward and downward earnings 
management through discretionary security gains and losses but are not associated with 
downward earnings management through discretionary loan loss provisions. 
In addition, I investigate bank-years which report small earnings changes before 
discretionary loan loss provisions or before discretionary security gains and losses in the high 
fair value sample and in the low fair value sample respectively. The results suggest that high fair 
value bank-years are more likely to manage earnings upward to beat prior year earnings targets 
by reducing the discretionary loan loss provisions or increasing discretionary security gains and 
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losses. By examining the factors which determine the net changes in fair values recognized in 
earnings, I find that net changes in fair values recognized in earnings are negatively associated 
with the income before net changes in fair values, which is consistent with earnings smoothing.  
Finally, I examine the association between earnings volatility and fair value variables and find 
that overall fair values and level 2 fair values are negatively associated with earnings volatility 
while level 3 fair values are positively associated with earnings volatility. The results imply that 
banks with high overall fair values or high level 2 fair values are more likely to report smoother 
earnings. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Definition of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent 
variables 
 
∆ROAINC 
a dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm has ∆ROA between 0 (inclusive) and 0.0014 
(exclusive), an earnings range defining small earnings increases, and zero otherwise;  where ∆ROA 
is defined as current year’s net income minus previous year’s net income, divided by total assets at 
the beginning of the previous year 
EM_UP1 
an indicator variable equal to one if a bank-year observation reports a negative earning change 
before discretionary loan loss provisions (∆ROA<0), and reports a small positive earning change 
after discretionary loan loss provisions (0≤ ∆ROA<0.0014), and zero otherwise 
EM_UP2 
an indicator variable equal to one if a bank has an earnings decrease before discretionary security 
gains and losses and reports a small earnings increase after discretionary security gains and losses, 
and zero otherwise 
EM_DN1 
an indicator variable equal to one if a bank has a large earnings increase before discretionary loan 
loss provisions (∆ROA>=0.0014) but reports a small earnings increase after discretionary loan loss 
provisions (0≤ ∆ROA<0.0014), and zero otherwise 
EM_DN2 
an indicator variable equal to one if a bank has a large earnings increase before discretionary 
security gains and losses but reports a small earnings increase after discretionary security gains and 
losses, and zero otherwise 
NCFV 
net recognized gains and losses on assets and liabilities elected for fair value options, divided by 
total assets at the beginning of the year 
Volatility 
Standard deviation of quarterly ROA from 2009Q1 to 2012Q4, quarterly ROA is calculated as 
quarterly net income deflated by the beginning of the quarter total assets 
Fair value 
variables  
FV the sum of total fair value assets and total fair value liabilities divided by the total assets at the 
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beginning of the year 
L1FV 
the sum of level 1 fair value assets and level 1 fair value liabilities divided by the total assets at the 
beginning of the year 
L2FV 
the sum of level 2 fair value assets and level 2 fair value liabilities divided by the total assets at the 
beginning of the year 
L3FV 
the sum of level 3 fair value assets and level 3 fair value liabilities divided by the total assets at the 
beginning of the year 
HFV 
a dichotomous variable equal to one if FV of a bank is greater than or equal to the median of a year, 
and zero otherwise 
L1HFV 
a dichotomous variable equal to one if L1FV of a bank is greater than or equal to the median of a 
year,  and zero otherwise 
L2HFV 
a dichotomous variable equal to one if L2FV of a bank is greater than or equal to the median of a 
year,  and zero otherwise 
L3HFV 
a dichotomous variable equal to one if L3FV of a bank is greater than or equal to the median of a 
year,  and zero otherwise 
∆FV change in total fair value assets and liabilities 
∆L1FV change in level 1 fair value assets and liabilities 
∆L2FV change in level 2 fair value assets and liabilities 
∆L3FV change in level 3 fair value assets and liabilities 
L1LOAN 
Level 1 Loans and leases measured at fair value divided by the total assets at the beginning of the 
year 
L2LOAN 
Level 2 Loans and leases measured at fair value divided by the total assets at the beginning of the 
year 
L3LOAN 
Level 3 Loans and leases measured at fair values divided by the total assets at the beginning of the 
year 
L1TRADEA Level 1 trading assets divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L2TRADEA Level 2 trading assets divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L3TRADEA Level 3 trading assets divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L1AFS Level 1 available-for-sale securities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L2AFS Level 2 available-for-sale securities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L3AFS Level 3 available-for-sale securities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
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L1FED Level 1 Federal funds sold and securities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L2FED Level 2 Federal funds sold and securities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L3FED Level 3 Federal funds sold and securities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L1OTHERA Level 1 other assets measured at fair value divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L2OTHERA Level 2 other assets measured at fair value divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L3OTHERA Level 3 other assets measured at fair value divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L1DEPOSIT Level 1 deposits divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L2DEPOSIT Level 2 deposits divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L3DEPOSIT Level 3 deposits divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L1TRADEL Level 1 trading liabilities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L2TRADEL Level 2 trading liabilities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L3TRADEL Level 3 trading liabilities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year 
L1OTHERL 
all other level 1 liabilities measured at fair value divided by the total assets at the beginning of the 
year, including federal funds purchases and securities, other borrowed money, subordinated notes 
and debentures, etc. 
L2OTHERL 
all other level 2 liabilities measured at fair value divided by the total assets at the beginning of the 
year, including federal funds purchases and securities, other borrowed money, subordinated notes 
and debentures, etc. 
L3OTHERL 
all other level 3 liabilities measured at fair value divided by the total assets at the beginning of the 
year, including federal funds purchases and securities, other borrowed money, subordinated notes 
and debentures, etc. 
  
Control variables 
 
PUBLIC a dichotomous variable equal to one if a bank is a public bank, and zero otherwise14 
Log (ASSET) natural log of total assets 
∆ASSET change in total assets 
LEVERAGE total liabilities divided by total assets at the beginning of the year 
                                                 
14 I use a CRSP-FRB LINK dataset to identify publicly traded banks which have PERMCOs in CRSP. I randomly select 20 banks and manually check if they file 10-Ks with the 
SEC to make sure my classification of public banks is correct.  
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∆CF 
change in cash flows, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year, where cash flow is 
calculated as the total of net income plus loan loss provisions and non-interest expenses 
∆NPL change in nonperforming loans, divided by the average of beginning and ending total loans 
∆LOANR change in the real estate loans, divided by total loans at the beginning of the year 
∆LOANC change in the commercial loans, divided by total loans at the beginning of the year 
∆LOAND change in the depository institution loans, divided by total loans at the beginning of the year 
∆LOANA change in the loans to agricultural productions, divided by total loans at the beginning of the year 
∆LOANI change in the loans to households and individuals, divided by total loans at the beginning of the year 
∆LOANO 
change in other loans, including the loans to foreign governments, divided by total loans at the 
beginning of the year 
DLLP discretionary loan loss provision estimated from equation (1) 
DRSGL discretionary realized security gains and losses estimated from equation (2) 
IBFV 
net income minus net change in fair values of assets and liabilities elected for fair value option 
recognized in earnings, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year 
CAPITAL_FVO 
total risk-based capital before recognized net gains and losses measured at fair value option, divided 
by total assets at the beginning of the year 
  
Variables used to estimate DLLP and DRSGL 
LLP loan loss provision divided by the average of beginning and ending total loans 
LLR loan loss reserve at the beginning of the year divided by the ending total loans 
LOANR real estate loans divided by total loans 
LOANC commercial loans divided by total loans 
LOAND loans to depository institution loans divided by total loans 
LOANA loans to agricultural productions divided by total loans 
LOANI loans to households and individuals divided by total loans 
LOANO Other loans, including loans to foreign governments, divided by total loans 
RSGL realized security gains and losses divided by total assets at the beginning of the year 
TSGL 
total security gains and losses, measured by the sum of realized security gains and losses and 
unrealized security gains and losses, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year 
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Appendix B: Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies FR Y-9C 
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Appendix C: Fair Value Measurements Disclosure in 10-K of WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 
(in millions) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
 
Netting 
 
Total 
31-Dec-12 
       
Trading assets (excluding derivatives) 
       
Securities of U.S. Treasury and federal agencies 5,104 3,774 - 
 
- 
 
8,878 
Securities of U.S. states and political subdivisions - 1,587 46 
 
- 
 
1,633 
Collateralized debt obligations (1) - - 742 
 
- 
 
742 
Corporate debt securities - 6,664 52 
 
- 
 
6,716 
Mortgage-backed securities - 13,380 6 
 
- 
 
13,386 
Asset-backed securities - 722 138 
 
- 
 
860 
Equity securities 3,481 356 3 
 
- 
 
3,840 
Total trading securities (2) 8,585 26,483 987 
 
- 
 
36,055 
Other trading assets 2,150 887 76 
 
- 
 
3,113 
   
Total trading assets 
(excluding derivatives) 
10,735 27,370 1,063 
 
- 
 
39,168 
Securities of U.S. Treasury and federal agencies 915 6,231 - 
 
- 
 
7,146 
Securities of U.S. states and political subdivisions - 35,045 3,631 -3 - 
 
38,676 
Mortgage-backed securities: 
       
Federal agencies - 97,285 - 
 
- 
 
97,285 
Residential - 15,837 94 
 
- 
 
15,931 
Commercial - 19,765 203 
 
- 
 
19,968 
Total mortgage-backed securities - 132,887 297 
 
- 
 
133,184 
Corporate debt securities 125 20,934 274 
 
- 
 
21,333 
Collateralized debt obligations (4) - - 13,188 -3 - 
 
13,188 
Asset-backed securities: 
       
Auto loans and leases - 7 5,921 -3 - 
 
5,928 
Home equity loans - 867 51 
 
- 
 
918 
Other asset-backed securities - 7,828 3,283 -3 - 
 
11,111 
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Total asset-backed securities - 8,702 9,255 
 
- 
 
17,957 
Other debt securities - 930 - 
 
- 
 
930 
Total debt securities 1,040 204,729 26,645 
 
- 
 
232,414 
Marketable equity securities: 
       
Perpetual preferred securities (5) 629 753 794 -3 - 
 
2,176 
Other marketable equity securities 554 55 - 
 
- 
 
609 
Total marketable equity securities 1,183 808 794 
 
- 
 
2,785 
Total securities available for sale 2,223 205,537 27,439 
 
- 
 
235,199 
Mortgages held for sale - 39,055 3,250 
 
- 
 
42,305 
Loans held for sale - 6 - 
 
- 
 
6 
Loans - 185 6,021 
 
- 
 
6,206 
Mortgage servicing rights (residential) - - 11,538 
 
- 
 
11,538 
Derivative assets: 
       
Interest rate contracts 16 70,277 1,058 
 
- 
 
71,351 
Commodity contracts - 3,386 70 
 
- 
 
3,456 
Equity contracts 432 2,747 604 
 
- 
 
3,783 
Foreign exchange contracts 19 5,481 24 
 
- 
 
5,524 
Credit contracts - 1,160 650 
 
- 
 
1,810 
Other derivative contracts - - - 
 
- 
 
- 
Netting - - - 
 
-62,108 -6 -62,108 
Total derivative assets (7) 467 83,051 2,406 
 
-62,108 
 
23,816 
Other assets 136 123 162 
 
- 
 
421 
Total assets recorded at fair value 13,561 355,327 51,879 
 
-62,108 
 
358,659 
Derivative liabilities: 
       
 
Interest rate contracts -52 -68,244 -399 
 
- 
 
-68,695 
 
Commodity contracts - -3,541 -49 
 
- 
 
-3,590 
 
Equity contracts -199 -3,239 -726 
 
- 
 
-4,164 
 
Foreign exchange contracts -23 -3,553 -3 
 
- 
 
-3,579 
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Credit contracts - -1,152 -1,800 
 
- 
 
-2,952 
 
Other derivative contracts - - -78 
 
- 
 
-78 
  
Netting - - - 
 
71,116 -6 71,116 
   
Total derivative liabilities (7) -274 -79,729 -3,055 
 
71,116 
 
-11,942 
Short sale liabilities: 
       
 
Securities of U.S. Treasury and federal agencies -4,225 -875 - 
 
- 
 
-5,100 
 
Securities of U.S. states and political 
subdivisions 
- -9 - 
 
- 
 
-9 
 
Corporate debt securities - -3,941 - 
 
- 
 
-3,941 
 
Equity securities -1,233 -35 - 
 
- 
 
-1,268 
 
Other securities - -47 - 
 
- 
 
-47 
  
Total short sale liabilities -5,458 -4,907 - 
 
- 
 
-10,365 
Other liabilities - -34 -49 
 
- 
 
-83 
Total liabilities recorded at fair value -5,732 -84,670 -3,104 
 
71,116 
 
-22,390 
1. Includes collateralized loan obligations of $721 million that are classified as trading assets. 
2. Net gains from trading activities recognized in the income statement include $305 million in net unrealized gains on trading securities held at 
December 31, 2012. 
3. Balances consist of securities that are predominantly investment grade based on ratings received from the ratings agencies or internal credit 
grades categorized as investment grade if external ratings are not available. The securities are classified as Level 3 due to limited market 
activity. 
4. Includes collateralized loan obligations of $12.5 billion that are classified as securities available for sale. 
5. Perpetual preferred securities include ARS and corporate preferred securities. See Note 8 for additional information. 
6. Derivatives are reported net of cash collateral received and paid and, to the extent that the criteria of the accounting guidance covering the 
offsetting of amounts related to certain contracts are met, positions with the same counterparty are netted as part of a legally enforceable 
master netting agreement. 
7. Derivative assets and derivative liabilities include contracts qualifying for hedge accounting, economic hedges, and derivatives included in 
trading assets and trading liabilities, respectively. 
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Appendix D: Changes in Level 3 assets and liabilities measured at fair value on a recurring basis in 10-K of  
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 
  
Total net gains 
(losses) 
included 
      
(in millions) 
Beginning 
Balance 
Net 
Income 
OCI 
Purchase, 
Sales, 
Insurances, 
Settlements, 
Net (1) 
Transfers 
into 
Level3 
Transfers 
out of 
Level 3 
Balance 
End of 
period 
Net 
unrealized 
gains 
(losses) 
included in 
income 
related to 
assets and 
liabilities 
held at 
period end 
(2) 
 
Year ended December 31, 2012 
         
Trading assets 
(excluding derivatives): 
         
         
Securities of U.S. states and 
political subdivisions 
         
53 3 - -10 - - 46 - 
 
Collateralized debt obligations 1,582 -191 - -649 - - 742 -47 
 
Corporate debt securities 97 - - -45 - - 52 -3 
 
Mortgage-backed securities 108 8 - -110 - - 6 2 
 
Asset-backed securities 190 48 - -98 14 -16 138 23 
 
Equity securities 4 - - -1 - - 3 - 
 
                                  Total trading securities 2,034 -132 - -913 14 -16 987 -25 
 
                 Other trading assets 115 -39 - - - - 76 -19 
 
Total trading assets 
(excluding derivatives) 
         
2,149 -171 - -913 14 -16 1,063 -44 -3 
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Securities available for sale: 
         
Securities of U.S. states and 
political subdivisions 
         
11,516 10 160 1,347 - -9,402 3,631 - 
 
Mortgage-backed securities: 
         
Residential 61 12 16 50 29 -74 94 -1 
 
Commercial 232 -56 57 -30 - - 203 -56 
 
Total mortgage-backed 
securities 
         
293 -44 73 20 29 -74 297 -57 
 
Corporate debt securities 295 20 19 -20 1 -41 274 - 
 
Collateralized debt obligations 8,599 135 514 3,940 - - 13,188 - 
 
Asset-backed securities: 
         
Auto loans and leases 6,641 3 3 -726 - - 5,921 - 
 
Home equity loans 282 15 14 -3 29 -286 51 -1 
 
Other asset-backed securities 2,863 -29 148 329 1 -29 3,283 -6 
 
Total asset-backed securities 9,786 -11 165 -400 30 -315 9,255 -7 
 
Total debt securities 30,489 110 931 4,887 60 -9,832 26,645 -64 -4 
Marketable equity securities: 
         
Perpetual preferred securities 1,344 91 -30 -611 - - 794 - 
 
Other marketable equity securities 23 2 -16 -9 - - - - 
 
Total marketable 
equity securities 
1,367 93 -46 -620 - - 794 - -5 
 Total securities 
 available for sale 
31,856 203 885 4,267 60 -9,832 27,439 -64 
 
Mortgages held for sale 3,410 -42 - -308 488 -298 3,250 -30 -6 
Loans 23 43 - 145 5,851 -41 6,021 43 -6 
Mortgage servicing rights 12,603 -5,954 - 4,889 - - 11,538 -2,893 -6 
Net derivative assets and liabilities: 
         
Interest rate contracts 609 7,397 - -7,349 - 2 659 562 
 
Commodity contracts - 78 - -50 -8 1 21 40 
 
Equity contracts -75 -11 - 18 - -54 -122 -16 
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1. Represents only net gains (losses) that are due to changes in economic conditions and management's estimates of fair value and excludes changes 
due to the collection/realization of cash flows over time. 
2. Included in trading activities and other noninterest income in the income statement. 
3. Included in debt securities available for sale in the income statement. 
4. Included in equity investments in the income statement. 
5. Included in mortgage banking and other noninterest income in the income statement. 
6. Included in mortgage banking, trading activities and other noninterest income in the income statement. 
  
Foreign exchange contracts -7 23 - 5 - - 21 30 
 
Credit contracts -1,998 38 - 810 - - -1,150 41 
 
Other derivative contracts -117 40 -1 - - - -78 - 
 
Total derivative contracts -1,588 7,565 -1 -6,566 -8 -51 -649 657 -7 
Other assets 244 -21 - -61 - - 162 -8 -3 
Short sale liabilities - - - - - - - - -3 
Other liabilities (excluding derivatives) -44 -43 - 38 - - -49 - -6 
50 
 
 
 
CHARTS AND TABLES 
Figure 1 Composition of fair value assets and liabilities 
Panel A: Composition of fair value assets and liabilities 
 
 
Panel B: Composition of level 1 fair value 
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Panel C: Composition of level 2 fair values 
 
Panel D: Composition of level 3 fair values 
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Figure 2 Growth of fair value assets and liabilities 2009-2012 
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Figure 3 Distributions of change in return on assets  
Figure 3 plots the distributions of change in return on assets for the high fair value sample and the low fair value sample. There are 1,448 bank-
years reporting fair values higher than the median and 1,448 bank-years reporting fair values lower than the median. The bin width is calculated 
using the sample of   bank-years which have value for ∆ROA. The bin width in this study is 0.0007. 
Panel A: Comparison of distributions of change in return on assets between the low fair value sample and the high fair value sample 
 
Change in ROA: Low fair value banks vs. High fair value banks 
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Panel B: Comparison of distributions of change in return on assets between the low level 2 fair value sample and the high level 2 fair value sample 
Change in ROA: Low level2 fair value banks vs. High level2 fair value banks  
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Panel C: Comparison of distributions of change in return on assets between the low AFS sample and the high AFS sample 
 
Change in ROA: Low AFS banks vs. High AFS banks 
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Panel D: Comparison of distributions of change in return on assets between the low level 1 fair value sample and the high level 1 fair value sample 
 
Change in ROA: Low level1 fair value banks vs. High level1 fair value banks 
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Panel E: Comparison of distributions of change in return on assets between the low level 3 fair value sample and the high level 3 fair value sample 
 
Change in ROA: Low level3 fair value banks vs. High level3 fair value banks 
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Table 1 Data and sample selection 
Panel A: Sample selection procedure 
 
Bank-years Unique Banks 
Initial sample of U.S. bank holding companies which filed report FR-Y9C to Federal 
Reserve Bank in the period of 2005-2012 
Less: Observations with missing data to calculate discretionary loan loss provisions, 
discretionary security gains and losses and change in ROA 
43,945 7,061 
(38,634) (5,914) 
Sample to calculate bin width 5,311 1,147 
Less: Observations with missing data on fair value assets and liabilities and observations in 
2007 and 2008 
(1783) (86) 
Banks with missing years data from 2009 to 2012 (632) (337) 
Final sample 2,896 724 
Panel B: Distributions of banks by years across the high fair value sample and low fair value sample 
 
 
 
 
Schedule HC-Q Financial Assets and Liabilities Measured at Fair Value is to be completed by bank holding companies that have adopted FASB Statement No. 157, “Fair Value 
Measurements,” and (1) have elected to account for financial instruments or servicing assets and liabilities at fair value under a fair value option or (2) are required to complete 
Schedule HC-D—Trading Assets and Liabilities. This schedule is required to be completed by all bank holding companies since 2009. 
 
  
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
HFV 362 362 362 362 1,448 
LFV 362 362 362 362 1,448 
Total 724 724 724 724 2,896 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 
High fair value banks Low fair value banks 
 
 
N Mean Median STD Q1 Q3 N Mean Median STD Q1 Q3 Difference 
ΔROAINC 1448 0.220 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.000 1448 0.161 0.000 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.059*** 
ΔROAINCt+1 1086 0.212 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.000 1086 0.166 0.000 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.046*** 
ΔROA 1448 0.002 0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.004 1448 0.001 0.001 0.012 -0.002 0.005     0.001 
EM_UP1 1448 0.136 0.000 0.343 0.000 0.000 1448 0.080 0.000 0.272 0.000 0.000 0.056*** 
EM_UP2 1448 0.050 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.000 1448 0.023 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.027*** 
EM_DN1 1448 0.055 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.000 1448 0.057 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.000    -0.003 
EM_DN2 1448 0.084 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.000 1448 0.050 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.000 0.034*** 
Volatility 1448 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 1448 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.001*** 
PUBLIC 1448 0.400 0.000 0.490 0.000 1.000 1448 0.363 0.000 0.481 0.000 1.000     0.037** 
FV 1448 0.317 0.281 0.124 0.231 0.364 1448 0.116 0.122 0.052 0.080 0.159 0.201*** 
L1FV 1448 0.059 0.001 0.116 0.000 0.035 1448 0.023 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.013 0.036*** 
L2FV 1448 0.244 0.242 0.139 0.192 0.324 1448 0.091 0.097 0.063 0.032 0.146 0.153*** 
L3FV 1448 0.009 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.004 1448 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.006*** 
L1FVA 1448 0.058 0.001 0.113 0.000 0.033 1448 0.023 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.013 0.035*** 
L2FVA 1448 0.241 0.239 0.137 0.190 0.322 1448 0.090 0.096 0.063 0.032 0.145 0.151*** 
L3FVA 1448 0.009 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.004 1448 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.006*** 
L1FVL 1448 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 1448 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 
L2FVL 1448 0.003 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 1448 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 
L3FVL 1448 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 1448 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
ΔFV 1286 0.079 0.045 0.151 0.007 0.107 1262 0.016 0.005 0.055 -0.012 0.034 0.063*** 
L1ΔFV 1286 0.010 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.003 1262 0.002 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.001 0.008*** 
L2ΔFV 1286 0.066 0.033 0.130 0.000 0.098 1262 0.014 0.000 0.050 -0.007 0.026 0.052*** 
L3ΔFV 1286 0.001 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.000 1262 -0.001 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000     0.001 
ASSETS 
( mil$) 
1448 11,807  1,142 44,862 769  2,294 1448  4,733  1,087 16,312 696  2,385  7,074*** 
ΔASSETS 1448 0.051 0.038 0.102 -0.004 0.087 1448 0.014 0.011 0.094 -0.037 0.058 0.037*** 
ΔNPL 1448 0.000 0.000 0.019 -0.008 0.007 1448 0.000 0.000 0.020 -0.009 0.008     0.000 
ΔCF 1448 0.001 0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.003 1448 0.000 0.000 0.009 -0.002 0.003     0.001** 
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ΔLOANR 1448 -0.006 -0.003 0.082 -0.047 0.035 1448 -0.016 -0.009 0.085 -0.058 0.033 0.010*** 
ΔLOANC 1448 -0.001 -0.002 0.030 -0.014 0.012 1448 -0.004 -0.003 0.030 -0.017 0.009 0.003*** 
ΔLOAND 1448 0.009 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.000 1448 -0.003 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.000     0.012** 
ΔLOANA 1448 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 1448 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000     0.000 
ΔLOANI 1448 -0.002 -0.002 0.013 -0.005 0.000 1448 -0.002 -0.002 0.010 -0.005 0.000     0.001 
ΔLOANO 1448 0.002 0.000 0.011 -0.002 0.003 1448 0.002 0.000 0.010 -0.001 0.002     0.001 
DLLP 1448 -0.002 -0.003 0.010 -0.007 0.002 1448 0.000 -0.001 0.011 -0.006 0.004 -0.002*** 
DRGL 1448 0.0001 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.001 1448 -0.0001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.0002*** 
RSGL 1448 0.0007 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 1448 0.0003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.0004*** 
Note: All continuous variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, (two-tailed), respectively 
 
  
61 
 
 
 
Table 3 Correlation coefficients 
 ΔROA 
INC 
PUBLIC FV L1FV L2FV L3FV HFV L1 
HFV 
L2 
HFV 
L3 
HFV 
ΔFV L1 
ΔFV 
L2 
ΔFV 
L3 
ΔFV 
DLLP DRSGL 
PUBLIC -0.003                
 0.889                
FV 0.062 0.041               
 0.001 0.027               
L1FV -0.020 -0.220 0.313              
 0.273 0.000 0.000              
L2FV 0.095 0.215 0.675 -0.382             
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000             
L3FV -0.030 0.009 0.323 0.002 0.069            
 0.103 0.640 0.000 0.924 0.000            
HFV 0.076 0.038 0.727 0.202 0.578 0.158           
 0.000    0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000           
L1HFV -0.012 -0.018 0.104 0.455 -0.180 -0.016 0.058          
 0.508 0.320 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.394 0.002          
L2HFV 0.062 0.196 0.517 -0.328 0.786 0.036 0.630 -0.171         
 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000         
L3HFV -0.028 0.261 0.151 -0.169 0.226 0.321 0.087 0.022 0.162        
 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.246 0.000        
ΔFV -0.021 0.022 0.316 0.164 0.184 0.055 0.265 0.048 0.192 0.019       
 0.288 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.328       
L1ΔFV -0.041 -0.054 0.132 0.433 -0.202 0.018 0.053 0.184 -0.161 -0.070 0.533      
 0.037 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.375 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
L2ΔFV 0.008 0.056 0.255 -0.142 0.347 -0.021 0.256 -0.088 0.330 0.053 0.656 -0.194     
 0.689 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000     
L3ΔFV 0.002 0.011 0.022 0.021 -0.010 0.199 0.025 0.008 0.016 0.058 0.399 0.261 0.023    
 0.908 0.591 0.268 0.280 0.624 0.000 0.215 0.682 0.415 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.243    
DLLP -0.075 -0.007 -0.088 -0.043 -0.069 0.028 -0.081 -0.079 -0.045 0.013 -0.046 -0.029 -0.047 0.011   
 0.000 0.690 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.495 0.020 0.149 0.017 0.596   
DRSGL -0.033 0.024 0.057 0.036 0.040 -0.005 0.071 0.010 0.045 0.005 0.006 0.037 -0.013 -0.031 0.093  
 0.074 0.193 0.002 0.055 0.031 0.779 0.000 0.603 0.016 0.793 0.744 0.062 0.502 0.115 0.000  
RSGL 0.026 -0.007 0.112 0.044 0.095 -0.052 0.124 -0.004 0.083 -0.083 -0.046 0.024 -0.058 -0.038 0.092 0.864 
 0.166 0.717 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.831 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.235 0.004 0.055 0.000 0.000 
Note: All continuous variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
62 
 
 
 
Table 4 Comparisons of bank-years with changes in return on assets just below zero and 
just above zero between high fair value banks and low fair value banks 
Panel A: High fair value banks vs. Low fair value banks 
 
Standardized Difference (Actual Number of Bank-Years in 
Interval) 
[Expected Number of Bank-Years in Interval] 
 
 
ΔROA between -0.0007 and 0 ΔROA between 0 and 0.0007 
HFV -4.094 4.692 
 
(71) (164) 
 
[115.5] [51] 
LFV -3.717 2.385 
 
(60) (109) 
 
[86.5] [92] 
 
Panel B: High level 2 fair value banks vs. Low level 2 fair value banks 
 
Standardized Difference (Actual Number of Bank-Years in 
Interval) 
[Expected Number of Bank-Years in Interval] 
 
 
ΔROA between -0.0007 and 0 ΔROA between 0 and 0.0007 
L2HFV -4.075 5.070 
 
(68) (162) 
 
[111] [108.5] 
L2LFV -3.835 1.986 
 
(63) (111) 
 
[91] [96.5] 
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Panel C: High AFS banks vs. Low AFS banks 
 
Standardized Difference (Actual Number of Bank-Years in 
Interval) 
[Expected Number of Bank-Years in Interval] 
 
 
ΔROA between -0.0007 and 0 ΔROA between 0 and 0.0007 
HAFS -4.179 5.294 
 
(73) (171) 
 
[118] [114] 
LAFS -3.776 1.597 
 
(58) (102) 
 
[84] [91] 
 
 
Panel D: High level 1 fair value banks vs. Low level 1 fair value banks 
 
Standardized Difference (Actual Number of Bank-Years in 
Interval) 
[Expected Number of Bank-Years in Interval] 
 
 
ΔROA between -0.0007 and 0 ΔROA between 0 and 0.0007 
L1HFV -4.318 4.632 
 
(71) (133) 
 
[98.5] [103.5] 
L1LFV -4.535 4.014 
 
(60) (140) 
 
[103.5] [101.5] 
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Panel E: High level 3 fair value banks vs. Low level 3 fair value banks 
 
Standardized Difference (Actual Number of Bank-Years in 
Interval) 
[Expected Number of Bank-Years in Interval] 
 
 
ΔROA between -0.0007 and 0 ΔROA between 0 and 0.0007 
L3HFV -3.807 4.271 
 
(57) (110) 
 
[77.5] [87] 
L3LFV -4.688 4.178 
 
(74) (163) 
 
[124.5] [118] 
 
Panel F: Test of differences in kinks  
Difference in percent of bank-years in the bin just above 
zero and in the bin just below zero (standard deviation of 
differences) 
Difference  
(t-value) 
HFV LFV 
 6.956 3.715 3.241 
(1.186) (0.818)      (2.249)** 
   L2HFV L2LFV 
 7.025 3.642 3.384 
(1.169) (0.823)      (2.367)*** 
   HAFS LAFS 
 7.303 3.349 3.954 
(1.198) (0.793)            (2.752)*** 
   L1HFV L1LFV 
 4.704 5.979 -1.275 
(0.834) (1.052) (-0.950) 
   L3HFV L3LFV 
 4.678 5.844 -1.166 
(0.854) (1.012) (-0.880) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5 Estimating discretionary accounting choices using Beatty et al. (2002) approach 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡  
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Variables LLP RSGL 
INTERCEPT -0.010 0.000 
 
(0.006)*** (0.344)*** 
Log(ASSET) 0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.000)*** (0.337) 
∆NPL 0.209 
 
 
(0.000)*** 
 
LLR 0.721 
 
 
(0.000)*** 
 
LOANR -0.004 
 
 
-0.140 
 
LOANC -0.008 
 
 
(0.024)** 
 
LOAND 0.007 
 
 
-0.902 
 
LOANA -0.018 
 
 
(0.000)*** 
 
LOANI -0.011 
 
 
(0.005)*** 
 
LOANO -0.030 
 
 
(0.000)*** 
 
TSGL 
 
0.141 
  
(0.000)*** 
N 5,311 5,311 
Adj R-sq 0.418 0.213 
Year variables Yes Yes 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 6 Logistic regressions of small earnings increases on fair value variables 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑉/𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐷𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐿1𝐹𝑉/𝐿1𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿2𝐹𝑉/𝐿2𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿3𝐹𝑉/𝐿3𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6∆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7∆𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐷𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Panel A: Control for discretionary security gains and losses 
Variables Small earnings increases 
INTERCEPT -0.512 -0.462 -0.550 -0.727 
 
(0.459) (0.504) (0.428) (0.306) 
PUBLIC -0.019 -0.079 -0.028 -0.064 
 
(0.886) (0.548) (0.832) (0.627) 
FV 0.972 
   
 
(0.011)** 
   
L1FV 
 
0.470 
  
  
(0.500) 
  
L2FV 
 
1.868 
  
  
(0.000)*** 
  
L3FV 
 
-4.382 
  
  
(0.172) 
  
HFV 
  
0.406 
 
   
(0.000)*** 
 
L1HFV 
   
-0.035 
    
(0.752) 
L2HFV 
   
0.355 
    
(0.002)*** 
L3HFV 
   
-0.163 
    
(0.171) 
Log(ASSET) -0.056 -0.066 -0.052 -0.031 
 
(0.271) (0.196) (0.304) (0.558) 
∆ASSET -1.342 -1.566 -1.409 -1.227 
 
(0.077)* (0.039)** (0.059)* (0.095)* 
∆CF 1.843 1.838 1.855 1.520 
 
(0.464) (0.470) (0.461) (0.543) 
∆NPL -14.007 -14.153 -13.830 -13.756 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANR 4.785 4.933 4.766 4.590 
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(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANC 0.376 0.611 0.404 0.358 
 
(0.827) (0.725) (0.815) (0.837) 
∆LOAND -0.126 -0.140 -0.128 -0.102 
 
(0.693) (0.671) (0.690) (0.748) 
∆LOANA 1.302 2.726 1.798 2.750 
 
(0.867) (0.723) (0.817) (0.724) 
∆LOANI -3.410 -3.683 -3.386 -4.647 
 
(0.522) (0.483) (0.524) (0.385) 
∆LOANO 6.415 5.838 7.043 6.726 
 
(0.150) (0.183) (0.116) (0.141) 
DLLP -17.470 -16.849 -17.287 -18.582 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
DRSGL -26.038 -28.161 -30.459 -26.335 
 
(0.349) (0.310) (0.270) (0.346) 
     
d.v.=1 552 552 552      552 
d.v.=0 2344 2344 2344      2344 
N 2896 2896 2896 2896 
Pseudo R-sq 0.064 0.072 0.069 0.068 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Panel B: Control for realized security gains and losses 
Variables Small earnings increases 
INTERCEPT -0.545 -0.486 -0.575 -0.747 
 
(0.430) (0.481) (0.406) (0.292) 
PUBLIC -0.025 -0.085 -0.033 -0.069 
 
(0.850) (0.519) (0.797) (0.600) 
FV 0.903 
   
 
(0.019)** 
   
L1FV 
 
0.388 
  
  
(0.578) 
  
L2FV 
 
1.795 
  
  
(0.000)*** 
  
L3FV 
 
-4.197 
  
  
(0.188) 
  
HFV 
  
0.385 
 
   
(0.000)*** 
 
L1HFV 
   
-0.040 
    
(0.720) 
L2HFV 
   
0.338 
    
(0.004)*** 
L3HFV 
   
-0.150 
    
(0.210) 
Log(ASSET) -0.054 -0.065 -0.051 -0.031 
 
(0.283) (0.205) (0.314) (0.559) 
∆ASSET -1.268 -1.496 -1.337 -1.168 
 
(0.090)* (0.047)** (0.070)* (0.110) 
∆CF 1.590 1.639 1.623 1.321 
 
(0.526) (0.518) (0.518) (0.597) 
∆NPL -16.021 -16.101 -15.787 -15.675 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANR 4.853 4.994 4.842 4.676 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANC 0.330 0.546 0.358 0.303 
 
(0.847) (0.752) (0.835) (0.861) 
∆LOAND -0.132 -0.144 -0.134 -0.110 
 
(0.679) (0.661) (0.677) (0.730) 
∆LOANA 1.281 2.729 1.768 2.716 
 
(0.870) (0.726) (0.822) (0.730) 
∆LOANI -3.334 -3.619 -3.318 -4.514 
 
(0.535) (0.494) (0.536) (0.402) 
∆LOANO 6.146 5.588 6.728 6.416 
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(0.171) (0.205) (0.135) (0.162) 
DLLP -18.512 -17.848 -18.248 -19.498 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
RSGL 38.410 29.543 30.362 34.546 
 
(0.140) (0.249) (0.239) (0.185) 
     
d.v.=1 552 552 552  552 
d.v.=0 2344 2344 2344  2344 
N 2896 2896 2896 2896 
Pseudo R-sq 0.065 0.073 0.069 0.068 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7 Logistic regressions of small earnings increases one-year ahead on  
fair value variable 
Panel A: Control for discretionary security gains and losses 
Variables Small earnings increases one-year ahead 
INTERCEPT -0.137 -0.026 -0.169 -0.456 
 
(0.856) (0.972) (0.822) (0.557) 
PUBLIC -0.169 -0.263 -0.175 -0.220 
 
(0.265) (0.087) (0.246) (0.154) 
FV 0.474 
   
 
(0.295) 
   
L1FV 
 
-0.725 
  
  
(0.378) 
  
L2FV 
 
1.548 
  
  
(0.004)*** 
  
L3FV 
 
-3.219 
  
  
(0.351) 
  
HFV 
  
0.281 
 
   
(0.024)** 
 
L1HFV 
   
-0.129 
    
(0.321) 
L2HFV 
   
0.326 
    
(0.012)** 
L3HFV 
   
-0.188 
    
(0.179) 
Log(ASSET) -0.074 -0.088 -0.074 -0.045 
 
(0.174) (0.111) (0.172) (0.433) 
∆ASSET -0.558 -0.819 -0.739 -0.702 
 
(0.507) (0.329) (0.370) (0.391) 
∆CF -3.944 -3.948 -3.849 -4.282 
 
(0.147) (0.153) (0.156) (0.116) 
∆NPL -9.973 -9.701 -9.710 -9.695 
 
(0.025)** (0.035)** (0.029)** (0.031)** 
∆LOANR 3.993 4.204 4.077 4.021 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANC 0.001 0.333 0.095 0.106 
 
(1.000) (0.873) (0.963) (0.960) 
∆LOAND -0.673 -0.718 -0.691 -0.686 
 
(0.133) (0.109) (0.126) (0.128) 
∆LOANA 4.834 6.395 5.344 6.283 
 
(0.596) (0.489) (0.557) (0.491) 
∆LOANI 3.280 2.395 3.496 2.216 
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(0.550) (0.657) (0.521) (0.685) 
∆LOANO 6.618 5.567 6.932 6.583 
 
(0.248) (0.322) (0.223) (0.250) 
DLLP -24.430 -24.314 -23.780 -25.432 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
DRSGL 2.244 -1.564 -1.898 0.124 
 
(0.937) (0.956) (0.946) (0.997) 
     
d.v.=1 410 410 410 410 
d.v.=0 1762 1762 1762 1762 
N 2172 2172 2172 2172 
Pseudo R-sq 0.055 0.066 0.058 0.062 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Panel B: Control for realized security gains and losses 
Variables Small earnings increases one-year ahead 
INTERCEPT -0.183 -0.064 -0.209 -0.473 
 
(0.809) (0.932) (0.781) (0.541) 
PUBLIC -0.170 -0.264 -0.177 -0.222 
 
(0.259) (0.084)* (0.240) (0.151) 
FV 0.399 
   
 
(0.378) 
   
L1FV 
 
-0.819 
  
  
(0.320) 
  
L2FV 
 
1.452 
  
  
(0.007)*** 
  
L3FV 
 
-2.877 
  
  
(0.398) 
  
HFV 
  
0.257 
 
   
(0.039)** 
 
L1HFV 
   
-0.132 
    
(0.312) 
L2HFV 
   
0.307 
    
(0.018)** 
L3HFV 
   
-0.167 
    
(0.236) 
Log(ASSET) -0.072 -0.086 -0.072 -0.045 
 
(0.184) (0.118) (0.179) (0.424) 
∆ASSET -0.549 -0.798 -0.733 -0.705 
 
(0.509) (0.339) (0.371) (0.388) 
∆CF -4.164 -4.133 -4.062 -4.431 
 
(0.125) (0.135) (0.134) (0.104) 
∆NPL -11.688 -11.474 -11.434 -11.252 
 
(0.012)** (0.016)** (0.014)** (0.016)** 
∆LOANR 4.067 4.263 4.159 4.108 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANC 0.057 0.363 0.153 0.161 
 
(0.978) (0.861) (0.941) (0.938) 
∆LOAND -0.685 -0.729 -0.702 -0.696 
 
(0.124) (0.102) (0.119) (0.120) 
∆LOANA 4.987 6.563 5.483 6.411 
 
(0.588) (0.482) (0.551) (0.487) 
∆LOANI 3.335 2.421 3.521 2.309 
 
(0.545) (0.656) (0.520) (0.674) 
∆LOANO 6.323 5.304 6.589 6.270 
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(0.270) (0.346) (0.247) (0.273) 
DLLP -25.538 -25.461 -24.861 -26.358 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
RSGL 63.664 57.218 57.568 55.788 
 
(0.019)** (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.037)** 
     
d.v.=1 410 410 410       410 
d.v.=0 1762 1762 1762      1762 
N 2172 2172 2172      2172 
Pseudo R-sq 0.058 0.068 0.060 0.064 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 8 Logistic regressions of small earnings increases on changes in assets and liabilities 
measured at fair value 
Variables Small earnings increases 
INTERCEPT -0.644 -0.648 -0.656 -0.660 
 
(0.371) (0.370) (0.361) (0.360) 
PUBLIC 0.025 0.011 0.015 0.000 
 
(0.853) (0.938) (0.911) (1.000) 
ΔFV 1.147 
 
1.135  
 
(0.045)** 
 
(0.043)**  
ΔL1FV 
 
-0.087  -0.145 
  
(0.896)  (0.828) 
ΔL2FV 
 
1.914  1.893 
  
(0.008)***  (0.008)*** 
ΔL3FV 
 
0.568  0.739 
  
(0.627)  (0.545) 
Log(ASSET) -0.031 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 
 
(0.559) (0.566) (0.560) (0.566) 
∆ASSET -1.256 -1.440 -1.162 -1.343 
 
(0.122) (0.086)* (0.145) (0.104) 
∆CF 5.598 5.542 5.300 5.224 
 
(0.040)** (0.043)** (0.050)* (0.055)* 
∆NPL -16.790 -16.279 -18.740 -18.290 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANR 4.766 4.902 4.868 4.999 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANC 0.236 0.364 0.148 0.273 
 
(0.896) (0.841) (0.934) (0.880) 
∆LOAND -0.025 -0.041 -0.036 -0.056 
 
(0.942) (0.907) (0.916) (0.873) 
∆LOANA -0.946 -0.752 -1.144 -0.901 
 
(0.911) (0.929) (0.893) (0.916) 
∆LOANI -4.162 -4.146 -4.094 -4.078 
 
(0.447) (0.447) (0.456) (0.457) 
∆LOANO 6.072 6.123 5.740 5.773 
 
(0.203) (0.196) (0.230) (0.224) 
DLLP -11.029 -11.060 -11.936 -11.998 
 
(0.020)** (0.020)** (0.012)** (0.012)** 
DRSGL -47.652 -46.248   
 
(0.124) (0.135)   
RSGL   19.549 20.966 
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   (0.489) (0.458) 
   
  
d.v.=1 504 504 504 504 
d.v.=0 2044 2044 2044 2044 
N 2548 2548 2548 2548 
Pseudo R-sq 0.063 0.066 0.062 0.066 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 9 Logistic regressions of small earnings increases one-year ahead on changes in 
assets and liabilities measured at fair value 
Variables Small earnings increases one-year ahead 
INTERCEPT -0.312 -0.275 -0.341 -0.307 
 
(0.691) (0.726) (0.663) (0.696) 
PUBLIC -0.079 -0.104 -0.087 -0.112 
 
(0.626) (0.525) (0.594) (0.494) 
ΔFV 0.887 
 
0.852 
 
 
(0.133) 
 
0.149 
 
ΔL1FV 
 
-1.474 
 
-1.567 
  
(0.186) 
 
(0.153) 
ΔL2FV 
 
1.489 
 
1.455 
  
(0.029)** 
 
(0.029)** 
ΔL3FV 
 
-2.353 
 
-2.081 
  
(0.198) 
 
(0.262) 
Log(ASSET) -0.056 -0.058 -0.055 -0.058 
 
(0.326) (0.307) (0.329) (0.310) 
∆ASSET -0.818 -0.812 -0.797 -0.792 
 
(0.374) (0.387) (0.382) (0.393) 
∆CF 0.518 0.390 0.239 0.094 
 
(0.860) (0.896) (0.935) (0.975) 
∆NPL -12.138 -11.343 -13.776 -13.138 
 
(0.013)** (0.024) (0.006)*** (0.011)** 
∆LOANR 4.335 4.393 4.450 4.496 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANC -0.183 0.017 -0.142 0.035 
 
(0.933) (0.994) (0.948) (0.987) 
∆LOAND -0.621 -0.616 -0.646 -0.643 
 
(0.227) (0.229) (0.210) (0.211) 
∆LOANA 4.769 5.227 4.782 5.363 
 
(0.630) (0.601) (0.632) (0.595) 
∆LOANI 2.080 1.862 1.985 1.798 
 
(0.720) (0.747) (0.733) (0.756) 
∆LOANO 6.518 6.050 6.131 5.651 
 
(0.287) (0.320) (0.317) (0.353) 
DLLP -13.519 -13.640 -14.407 -14.636 
 
(0.019)** (0.020)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
DRSGL -12.737 -9.526   
 
(0.689) (0.767)   
RSGL 
  
46.730 49.637 
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(0.117) (0.096)* 
 
    
d.v.=1 350 350 350            350 
d.v.=0 1474 1474 1474           1474 
N 1824 1824 1824 1824 
Pseudo R-sq 0.048 0.057 0.050 0.058 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table10 Logistic regressions of small earnings increases on different types of fair value 
assets and liabilities 
Variables Small earnings increases 
Small earnings increases one-
year ahead 
Intercept -0.691 -0.705 -0.549 -0.571 
 
(0.393) (0.383) (0.552) (0.536) 
PUBLIC -0.054 -0.061 -0.221 -0.223 
 
(0.690) (0.652) (0.163) (0.159) 
L1LOAN -21.421 -21.350 -168.700 -165.400 
 
(0.123) (0.134) (0.071)* (0.074)* 
L2LOAN -11.988 -12.093 -20.819 -21.076 
 
(0.249) (0.251) (0.032)** (0.032)** 
L3LOAN -19.249 -18.983 -3.509 -3.444 
 
(0.174) (0.173) (0.236) (0.252) 
L1TRADEA -15.458 -15.716 -57.643 -57.807 
 
(0.468) (0.458) (0.108) (0.106) 
L2TRADEA 5.474 5.409 15.869 15.806 
 
(0.227) (0.247) (0.005)*** (0.006)*** 
L3TRADEA -104.000 -105.900 -45.136 -50.249 
 
(0.171) (0.158) (0.683) (0.650) 
L1AFS 0.570 0.467 -0.552 -0.694 
 
(0.399) (0.495) (0.496) (0.396) 
L2AFS 1.974 1.909 1.544 1.435 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)*** (0.012)** 
L3AFS -7.506 -7.305 -10.248 -9.502 
 
(0.176) (0.186) (0.193) (0.198) 
L1FED 21.980 19.930 40.990 40.353 
 
(0.150) (0.210) (0.023)** (0.032)** 
L2FED 13.604 12.555 10.644 7.425 
 
(0.484) (0.509) (0.744) (0.817) 
L3FED -18.420 -11.999 -13.818 -10.097 
(0.876) (0.912) (0.867) (0.895) 
L1OTHERA -51.274 -51.510 -90.835 -94.911 
(0.080)* (0.083)* (0.242) (0.259) 
L2OTHERA -15.569 -15.903 -25.901 -26.771 
(0.415) (0.405) (0.233) (0.220) 
L3OTHERA -11.673 -11.940 -18.945 -19.278 
(0.189) (0.164) (0.175) (0.173) 
L1DEPOSIT 8.548 8.799 12.186 13.308 
 
(0.413) (0.410) (0.539) (0.524) 
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L2DEPOSIT -0.402 -0.182 5.657 6.201 
 
(0.985) (0.993) (0.725) (0.700) 
L3DEPOSIT 23.507 23.219 9.523 9.250 
 
(0.060)* (0.058)* (0.095)* (0.102) 
L1TRADEL 3.250 5.988 -7.409 -4.090 
 
(0.927) (0.861) (0.868) (0.927) 
L2TRADEL 0.009 -0.054 -7.965 -7.898 
 
(0.998) (0.991) (0.178) (0.185) 
L3TRADEL 186.800 190.900 178.100 186.000 
 
(0.363) (0.351) (0.580) (0.567) 
L1OTHERL 140.100 137.000 94.148 91.956 
 
(0.033)** (0.037)** (0.344) (0.357) 
L2OTHERL -22.929 -22.660 -47.854 -47.866 
 
(0.205) (0.210) (0.103) (0.103) 
L3OTHERL -56.398 -56.101 -49.816 -48.326 
 
(0.085)* (0.080)* (0.381) (0.383) 
Log(ASSET) -0.047 -0.046 -0.045 -0.044 
 
(0.422) (0.436) (0.499) (0.510) 
∆ASSET -1.615 -1.519 -0.698 -0.631 
 
(0.042)** (0.054)* (0.444) (0.488) 
∆CF 1.291 1.082 -4.454 -4.667 
 
(0.618) (0.675) (0.115) (0.099)* 
∆NPL -13.456 -15.629 -9.999 -11.818 
 
(0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.049)** (0.023)** 
∆LOANR 5.113 5.158 4.075 4.100 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANC 1.063 0.980 0.435 0.459 
 
(0.562) (0.592) (0.851) (0.842) 
∆LOAND -0.024 -0.032 -0.689 -0.697 
 
(0.947) (0.929) (0.171) (0.162) 
∆LOANA 2.017 1.944 5.196 5.292 
 
(0.797) (0.806) (0.578) (0.575) 
∆LOANI -4.147 -4.050 3.399 3.439 
 
(0.467) (0.481) (0.570) (0.568) 
∆LOANO 5.420 5.170 6.043 5.730 
 
(0.243) (0.268) (0.313) (0.339) 
DLLP -16.062 -17.068 -26.163 -27.276 
 
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
DRSGL -39.277 
 
-9.469 
 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.753) 
 
RSGL 
 
16.362 
 
48.058 
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(0.526) 
 
(0.087)* 
     
d.v.=1 552 552 410 410 
d.v.=0 2344 2344 1762 1762 
N 2896 2896 2172 2172 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.100 0.099 0.099 0.100 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table11 Logistic regressions of small earnings increases on different types of fair value 
assets and liabilities: the impact of AFS assets 
Variables Small earnings increases 
Small earnings increases one-
year ahead 
Intercept -0.676 -0.437 -0.593 -0.453 
 
(0.402) (0.588) (0.520) (0.621) 
PUBLIC -0.058 -0.027 -0.225 -0.194 
 
(0.666) (0.843) (0.156) (0.220) 
L1LOAN -21.191 -23.323 -166.100 -164.200 
 
(0.136) (0.108) (0.073)* (0.078)* 
L2LOAN -11.914 -13.820 -21.324 -23.233 
 
(0.252) (0.218) (0.031)** (0.021)** 
L3LOAN -19.156 -19.288 -3.464 -3.691 
 
(0.172) (0.146) (0.246) (0.211) 
L1TRADEA -14.068 -13.110 -58.731 -58.815 
 
(0.508) (0.548) (0.099)* (0.114) 
L2TRADEA 5.703 5.547 15.588 16.050 
 
(0.216) (0.202) (0.006)*** (0.004)*** 
L3TRADEA -101.000 -100.800 -53.209 -54.135 
 
(0.179) (0.185) (0.635) (0.630) 
L1AFS 0.459 -0.759 -0.689 -1.622 
 
(0.499) (0.232) (0.401) (0.035)** 
L2AFS 1.924 
 
1.435 
 
 
(0.000)*** 
 
(0.012)** 
 
L3AFS -7.473 -6.332 -9.536 -8.716 
 
(0.186) (0.178) (0.197) (0.184) 
L1FED 19.782 37.892 40.620 55.177 
 
(0.208) (0.024)** (0.031)** (0.003)*** 
L2FED 10.428 12.804 9.993 14.370 
 
(0.587) (0.511) (0.757) (0.650) 
L3FED -15.391 -56.358 -11.863 -22.904 
 
(0.895) (0.715) (0.879) (0.818) 
L1OTHERA -50.795 -54.555 -95.203 -97.178 
 
(0.085)* (0.068)* (0.258) (0.229) 
L2OTHERA -16.774 -19.777 -26.415 -28.443 
 
(0.380) (0.312) (0.228) (0.194) 
L3OTHERA -11.793 -7.681 -19.037 -16.532 
 
(0.178) (0.445) (0.180) (0.228) 
L1DEPOSIT 8.624 10.456 13.340 14.736 
 
(0.419) (0.331) (0.522) (0.467) 
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L2DEPOSIT -0.044 1.796 6.088 6.320 
 
(0.998) (0.928) (0.705) (0.682) 
L3DEPOSIT 23.434 22.879 9.141 9.033 
 
(0.058)* (0.053)* (0.103) (0.099)* 
L1TRADEL 2.031 -2.190 -2.343 -4.215 
 
(0.954) (0.950) (0.958) (0.927) 
L2TRADEL -0.210 -0.049 -7.848 -8.413 
 
(0.965) (0.991) (0.187) (0.143) 
L3TRADEL 169.700 154.300 201.200 198.600 
 
(0.416) (0.470) (0.536) (0.546) 
L1OTHERL 138.600 128.000 91.810 82.587 
 
(0.036)** (0.037)** (0.355) (0.379) 
L2OTHERL -21.768 -22.896 -47.867 -50.081 
 
(0.233) (0.208) (0.101) (0.085)* 
L3OTHERL -56.619 -52.407 -47.075 -45.913 
 
(0.081)* (0.098)* (0.392) (0.393) 
Log(ASSET) -0.048 -0.041 -0.042 -0.035 
 
(0.410) (0.481) (0.529) (0.599) 
∆ASSET -1.502 -0.582 -0.646 0.105 
 
(0.057)* (0.441) (0.479) (0.905) 
∆CF 1.071 0.652 -4.642 -4.990 
 
(0.679) (0.798) (0.101) (0.077)* 
∆NPL -15.645 -16.413 -11.522 -12.097 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.026)** (0.019)** 
∆LOANR 5.171 4.570 4.096 3.597 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** 
∆LOANC 0.909 0.467 0.498 0.124 
 
(0.621) (0.799) (0.829) (0.957) 
∆LOAND -0.038 -0.016 -0.690 -0.672 
 
(0.918) (0.964) (0.165) (0.169) 
∆LOANA 2.015 0.740 5.184 4.270 
 
(0.799) (0.927) (0.582) (0.648) 
∆LOANI -4.028 -3.927 3.437 3.295 
 
(0.485) (0.513) (0.567) (0.593) 
∆LOANO 5.017 5.606 5.945 6.433 
 
(0.284) (0.259) (0.322) (0.297) 
DLLP -17.076 -19.258 -27.074 -28.540 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
RSGL_AFS 16.553 40.054 40.486 55.411 
 
(0.543) (0.167) (0.175) (0.075)* 
RSGL_HTM -329.700 -244.700 358.000 445.400 
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(0.421) (0.558) (0.519) (0.431) 
     
d.v.=1 552 552 416 416 
d.v.=0 2344 2344 1762 1762 
N 2896 2896 2172 2172 
Pseudo R-sq 0.099 0.090 0.100 0.095 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 12 Bank-years with small earnings changes before DLLP and DRSGL 
Panel A: DLLP for bank-years with small changes in return on assets before DLLP 
 
∆ROA before DLLP 
just below 0 
Mean[Median](Std 
dev.) of DLLP 
∆ROA before DLLP 
just above 0 
Mean[Median](Std 
dev.) of DLLP 
Mean 
difference 
(p-value) 
HFV -0.0026 -0.0001 -0.0025 
 
[-0.0031] [-0.0013] (0.002)*** 
 
(0.0058) (0.0071) 
 
 
N=138 N=136 
 
    
LFV -0.0006 -0.0013 0.0007 
 
[-0.0018] [-0.0009] (0.449) 
 
(0.0070) (0.0068) 
 
 
N=111 N=139 
 
    
Mean difference -0.0019 0.0012 
 
between High and 
Low (p-value) 
(0.019)** (0.155) 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Panel B: DRSGL for bank-years with small changes in return on assets before DRSGL 
 
∆ROA before DRSGL 
just below 0 
Mean[Median](Std 
dev.) of DRSGL 
∆ROA before DRSGL 
just above 0 
Mean[Median](Std 
dev.) of DRSGL 
Mean 
difference 
(p-value) 
HFV 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0005 
 
[0.0003] [-0.0002] (0.001)*** 
 
(0.0017) (0.0014) 
 
 
N=155 N=218 
 
    
LFV 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 
 
[-0.0002] [-0.0003] (0.047)** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0010) 
 
 
N=136 N=196 
 
    
Mean difference 0.0004 0.0001 
 
between High and 
Low (p-value) 
(0.011)** (0.356) 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 13 Logistic regressions of upward and downward earnings management on  
fair values 
Variables EM_UP1 EM_UP2 EM_DN1 EM_DN2 
INTERCEPT -1.841 -0.177 -1.595 -1.126 
 
(0.032) (0.910) (0.249) (0.301) 
PUBLIC -0.223 0.269 0.261 -0.064 
 
(0.207) (0.327) (0.208) (0.765) 
L1FV -0.423 -0.538 0.677 0.876 
 
(0.657) (0.748) (0.530) (0.425) 
L2FV 2.140 2.696 0.730 1.796 
 
(0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.320) (0.009)*** 
L3FV -2.402 -13.595 -11.027 -3.903 
 
(0.566) (0.160) (0.015)** (0.465) 
Log(ASSET) -0.066 -0.269 -0.058 -0.123 
 
(0.302) (0.022)** (0.557) (0.122) 
∆ASSET -1.164 -1.911 -2.000 0.328 
 
(0.230) (0.230) (0.076)* (0.788) 
∆CF -2.453 -0.508 0.874 -1.792 
 
(0.464) (0.925) (0.840) (0.670) 
∆NPL -24.427 -15.433 5.377 -6.108 
 
(0.000)*** (0.035)** (0.393) (0.333) 
∆LOANR 5.346 4.992 5.741 3.382 
 
(0.000)*** (0.011)** (0.000)*** (0.014)** 
∆LOANC 0.476 1.877 -1.268 -0.634 
 
(0.827) (0.597) (0.726) (0.814) 
∆LOAND -0.380 -0.362 -0.261 -0.290 
 
(0.271) (0.505) (0.693) (0.603) 
∆LOANA -4.095 -16.878 4.639 5.230 
 
(0.692) (0.238) (0.695) (0.671) 
∆LOANI -12.247 5.046 5.112 5.007 
 
(0.060)* (0.610) (0.587) (0.464) 
∆LOANO 1.569 0.423 8.739 12.381 
 
(0.762) (0.965) (0.275) (0.036)** 
DLLP -90.641 -7.073 61.224 -25.999 
 
(0.000)*** (0.438) (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
DRSGL -19.699 654.400 54.899 -389.200 
 
(0.570) (0.000)*** (0.326) (0.000)*** 
     
d.v.=1 313 107 162 195 
d.v.=0 2583 2789 2734 2701 
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N 2896 2896 2896 2896 
Pseudo R-sq 0.137 0.188 0.147 0.132 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 14 Logistic regression of small earnings increase on fair value variables:  
Public vs. Private 
Panel A: Subsample of public banks 
Variables Small earnings increases 
INTERCEPT 0.537 0.190 0.450 0.116 
 
(0.571) (0.851) (0.634) (0.908) 
L1FV 0.549 
 
0.433 
 
 
(0.824) 
 
(0.861) 
 
L2FV 2.685 
 
2.578 
 
 
(0.001)*** 
 
(0.001)*** 
 
L3FV -9.418 
 
-9.596 
 
 
(0.082)* 
 
(0.085)* 
 
L1HFV 
 
-0.133 
 
-0.131 
  
(0.469) 
 
(0.477) 
L2HFV 
 
0.427 
 
0.395 
  
(0.023)** 
 
(0.034)** 
L3HFV 
 
-0.320 
 
-0.319 
  
(0.090)* 
 
(0.094)* 
Log(ASSET) -0.132 -0.074 -0.126 -0.070 
 
(0.045)** (0.299) (0.055)* (0.322) 
∆ASSET -2.831 -2.431 -2.641 -2.241 
 
(0.016)** (0.038)** (0.021)** (0.051)* 
∆CF 9.989 9.708 9.580 9.299 
 
(0.032)** (0.026)** (0.040)** (0.033)** 
∆NPL -21.556 -20.305 -23.150 -21.991 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)**8 
∆LOANR 5.076 4.494 4.980 4.411 
 
(0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** 
∆LOANC 0.475 0.345 0.404 0.266 
 
(0.873) (0.911) (0.891) (0.930) 
∆LOAND 0.018 0.084 0.007 0.060 
 
(0.977) (0.887) (0.992) (0.921) 
∆LOANA 4.733 9.619 4.435 9.151 
 
(0.805) (0.664) (0.818) (0.679) 
∆LOANI -2.813 -4.878 -2.618 -4.532 
 
(0.713) (0.541) (0.733) (0.569) 
∆LOANO 3.057 5.328 2.603 4.701 
 
(0.652) (0.465) (0.704) (0.522) 
DLLP -5.213 -9.026 -6.609 -10.423 
 
(0.468) (0.191) (0.363) (0.137) 
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DRSGL -47.324 -40.438 
  
 
(0.301) (0.387) 
  
RSGL 
  
24.618 41.142 
   
(0.561) (0.357) 
     
d.v.=1 209 209 209 209 
d.v.=0 895 895 895 895 
N 1104 1104 1104 1104 
Pseudo R-sq 0.109 0.101 0.109 0.101 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Panel B: Subsample of private banks 
Variables Small earnings increases 
INTERCEPT -2.874 -3.035 -2.834 -2.993 
 
(0.019)** (0.011)** (0.021)** (0.012)** 
L1FV 0.365 
 
0.313 
 
 
(0.635) 
 
(0.685) 
 
L2FV 1.461 
 
1.422 
 
 
(0.012)** 
 
(0.015)** 
 
L3FV -2.430 
 
-2.242 
 
 
(0.458) 
 
(0.490) 
 
L1HFV 
 
0.034 
 
0.028 
  
(0.820) 
 
(0.849) 
L2HFV 
 
0.303 
 
0.293 
  
(0.042)** 
 
(0.050)** 
L3HFV 
 
-0.046 
 
-0.035 
  
(0.759) 
 
(0.819) 
Log(ASSET) 0.102 0.121 0.099 0.118 
 
(0.247) (0.159) (0.261) (0.173) 
∆ASSET -0.650 -0.358 -0.610 -0.325 
 
(0.530) (0.713) (0.554) (0.739) 
∆CF -1.823 -2.083 -1.941 -2.198 
 
(0.560) (0.502) (0.534) (0.477) 
∆NPL -7.724 -8.107 -9.601 -9.956 
 
(0.149) (0.127) (0.074)* (0.063)* 
∆LOANR 4.618 4.376 4.720 4.491 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANC 0.120 -0.170 0.074 -0.206 
 
(0.957) (0.939) (0.973) (0.926) 
∆LOAND -0.322 -0.300 -0.321 -0.300 
 
(0.379) (0.399) (0.381) (0.400) 
∆LOANA 0.790 0.519 0.775 0.476 
 
(0.927) (0.952) (0.929) (0.957) 
∆LOANI -3.423 -3.870 -3.454 -3.863 
 
(0.650) (0.608) (0.650) (0.613) 
∆LOANO 8.215 8.144 8.130 8.054 
 
(0.156) (0.163) (0.160) (0.168) 
DLLP -25.217 -25.948 -25.937 -26.619 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
DRSGL -27.952 -27.236 
  
 
(0.433) (0.446) 
  
RSGL 
  
17.511 20.476 
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(0.593) (0.537) 
     
d.v.=1 343 343 343 343 
d.v.=0 1449 1449 1449 1449 
N 1792 1792 1792 1792 
Pseudo R-sq 0.070 0.067 0.069 0.067 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 15 Bank-years which elect fair value options and recognize change in fair values in 
earnings under fair value options: logistic regression of small earnings increase on fair 
value variables 
VARIABLE Small earnings increases 
INTERCEPT -1.010 -0.631 -1.246 
 
(0.528) (0.742) (0.445) 
PUBLIC -0.269 -0.142 -0.203 
 
(0.568) (0.774) (0.650) 
L1FV 0.607 
  
 
(0.732) 
  
L2FV -0.012 
  
 
(0.994) 
  
L3FV -2.558 
  
 
(0.652) 
  
L1HFV 
 
0.315 
 
  
(0.472) 
 
L2HFV 
 
-0.489 
 
  
(0.167) 
 
L3HFV 
 
0.144 
 
  
(0.782) 
 
ΔL1FV 
  
-10.368 
   
(0.120) 
ΔL2FV 
  
-0.359 
   
(0.875) 
ΔL3FV 
  
-10.644 
   
(0.483) 
Log(ASSET) -0.007 -0.043 0.001 
 
(0.954) (0.777) (0.990) 
∆ASSET -2.192 -1.735 -2.185 
 
(0.425) (0.557) (0.545) 
∆CF 11.758 11.980 15.799 
 
(0.264) (0.262) (0.212) 
∆NPL -18.152 -16.159 -19.224 
 
(0.066)* (0.084)* (0.083)* 
∆LOANR 4.962 4.534 5.668 
 
(0.162) (0.204) (0.195) 
∆LOANC 5.206 5.654 4.298 
 
(0.308) (0.295) (0.425) 
∆LOAND 0.641 0.820 0.564 
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(0.325) (0.255) (0.376) 
∆LOANA 8.488 -1.554 8.457 
 
(0.804) (0.963) (0.812) 
∆LOANI 9.127 10.316 7.667 
 
(0.371) (0.337) (0.450) 
∆LOANO 5.908 5.120 3.195 
 
(0.562) (0.636) (0.794) 
DLLP -12.550 -13.328 -3.938 
 
(0.425) (0.403) (0.804) 
DRSGL -52.112 -55.624 -33.542 
 
(0.515) (0.505) (0.748) 
    
d.v.=1 56 56 53 
d.v.=0 268 268 258 
N 324 324 311 
Pseudo R-sq 0.094 0.107 0.120 
Likelihood ratio 18.788 21.602 23.159 
p-value 0.471 0.305 0.185 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
 
  
93 
 
 
 
Table 16 OLS regression of net changes in fair values recognized in earnings under fair 
value option 
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐵𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿1𝐻𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿2𝐻𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿3𝐻𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿1𝐻𝐹𝑉𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐿2𝐻𝐹𝑉𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿3𝐻𝐹𝑉𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9∆𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐹𝑉𝑂𝑖𝑡+𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Variables NCFV 
INTERCEPT 0.000 
 
(0.813) 
PUBLIC 0.000 
 
(0.963) 
IBFV -0.035 
 
(0.020)** 
L1FVA 0.002 
 
(0.576) 
L2FVA 0.004 
 
(0.034)** 
L3FVA 0.011 
 
(0.101) 
FVL -0.021 
 
(0.000)*** 
DLLP -0.034 
 
(0.025)** 
DRSGL -0.019 
 
(0.759) 
Log(ASSETS) 0.000 
 
(0.699) 
CAPITAL_FVO -0.009 
 
(0.187) 
  
N 324 
Adj R-sq 0.175 
Year variables Yes 
Firm clustering Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 17 Bank-years which recognize nonzero realized gains and losses on available-for-
sale assets: logistic regression of small earnings increase on fair value variables 
Variables Small earnings increases 
INTERCEPT -0.197 -0.530 -0.406 
 
(0.766) (0.444) (0.549) 
L1FV 0.898 
  
 
(0.198) 
  
L2FV 2.186 
  
 
(0.000)*** 
  
L3FV -5.494 
  
 
(0.098)* 
  
L1HFV 
 
-0.053 
 
  
(0.656) 
 
L2HFV 
 
0.330 
 
  
(0.007)*** 
 
L3HFV 
 
-0.236 
 
  
(0.058)* 
 
∆L1FV 
  
-0.227 
   
(0.780) 
∆L2FV 
  
2.117 
   
(0.009)*** 
∆L3FV 
  
-0.504 
   
(0.645) 
Log(ASSET) -0.092 -0.043 -0.050 
 
(0.052) (0.400) (0.294) 
∆ASSET -1.374 -0.823 -1.261 
 
(0.092) (0.300) (0.175) 
∆CF 2.059 1.568 5.716 
 
(0.452) (0.557) (0.049)** 
∆NPL -14.808 -14.134 -16.006 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
∆LOANR 4.881 4.366 4.965 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LOANC 0.481 0.150 0.475 
 
(0.802) (0.937) (0.808) 
∆LOAND -0.016 0.020 0.035 
 
(0.960) (0.948) (0.915) 
∆LOANA 6.974 6.718 2.392 
 
(0.401) (0.428) (0.789) 
∆LOANI -3.182 -4.546 -2.923 
95 
 
 
 
 
(0.567) (0.422) (0.603) 
∆LOANO 5.315 6.431 6.299 
 
(0.262) (0.198) (0.215) 
DLLP -15.085 -17.519 -9.063 
 
(0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.070)* 
DRSGL -38.900 -37.886 -56.872 
 
(0.158) (0.174) (0.063)* 
    
d.v.=1 492 492 492 
d.v.=0 2005 2005 2005 
N 2497 2497 2497 
Pseudo R-sq 0.079 0.071 0.069 
Year variables Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering Yes Yes Yes 
I adjust for firm-level clustering when calculating the standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 18 OLS regression of earnings volatility on fair value variables 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑉𝑖/𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽3log (𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆) + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
Variables Earnings Volatility 
INTERCEPT -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 -0.020 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
PUBLIC 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** 
FV -0.002 
   
 
(0.029)** 
   
L1FV 
 
-0.003 
  
  
(0.027)** 
  
L2FV 
 
-0.004 
  
  
(0.000)*** 
  
L3FV 
 
0.018 
  
  
(0.002)*** 
  
HFV 
  
-0.001 
 
   
(0.004)*** 
 
L1HFV 
   
0.000 
    
(0.327) 
L2HFV 
   
-0.001 
    
(0.003)*** 
L3HFV 
   
0.001 
    
(0.001)*** 
Log(ASSET) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.359 0.424 0.328 0.984 
LEVERAGE 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.024 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
     
N 724 724 724 724 
Adjusted R-sq 0.061 0.081 0.066 0.074 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, (two-tailed), respectively. 
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